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Abstract
This dissertation examines the circumstances 
surrounding and the rhetoric involved in the cold fusion 
controversy begun on March 23, 1989, when two University 
of Utah electrochemists, Martin Fleischmann and Stanley 
Pons, announced by press conference the discovery of room— 
temperature nuclear fusion. The dissertation seeks to 
determine to what extent a rhetorical analysis of cold 
fusion discourse may increase understanding of the 
controversy; the success of Fleischmann and Pons as 
scientific rhetors; the ways in which scientists' 
attitudes, values, and assumptions manifest themselves in 
the discourse; and finally, what may be learned about 
scientific discourse in general by examining the cold 
fusion controversy in particular. The dissertation employs 
a method of analysis which combines Lawrence J. Prelli's 
special theory of scientific rhetoric that identifies 
relevant issues and lines of argument in scientific 
discourse, and S. Michael Halloran's method of close 
textual reading suggested in his study of DNA discourse. 
Examined were Fleischmann and Pons's initial publication 
announcing the cold fusion discovery in the Journal of 
Electroanalvtical Chemistry; Steven E. Jones's initial 
publication of his cold fusion discovery and several 
representative discourse samples from the journal Nature; 
and Fleischmann and Pons's latest article in the Journal of
v
Fusion Technology. Several issues and lines of argument 
were identified. For the most part, cold fusion discourse 
addressed evidential issues, questioning the existence of 
the cold fusion phenomenon. Several lines of argument were 
evoked to address this issue, including experimental 
competence, experimental replication, external consistency, 
communality, and disinterestedness. Also discovered is 
division between electrochemists and physicists over what 
constitutes valid evidence: electrochemists looked to
excess heat production as proof of fusion; physicists 
looked to neutron production. The study concludes that 
Fleischmann and Pons followed an unsuccessful rhetorical 
strategy in their initial published paper, one that 
addresses of issue of existence, but their evidence was 
insufficient to convince as to the scientific 
reasonableness of the cold fusion claim. An alternative 
rhetorical strategy was available to Fleischmann and Pons, 
one in which they could have interpreted, rather than 
asserted, their evidence, thereby evoking a less 
confrontational response from the scientific community.
Chapter One: Introduction
Historians, philosophers, and sociologists have,
within the last thirty years, begun to renew their
attention to and reevaluate the way in which science
operates. A prominent reason for this vigorous interest in
science seems clear: more and more, science is becoming a
fundamental part of everyday life, typically as expanding
technology. As S. Michael Halloran observes, scientific
matters are increasingly debated in the public arena (once,
interestingly, the province of rhetoric):
Science is itself an increasingly public 
enterprise, both in the sense that the public 
supports it financially and in the sense that it 
offers monumental threats and promises to our 
well-being. Science also serves as warrant for 
many arguments about traditionally non­
specialized, civic questions —  war and peace, 
ways and means for promoting the public welfare.
To understand public discourse in the closing 
decades of this century, we must have some 
understanding of scientific discourse. (81)
For similar reasons, Michael S. Overington argues, "it is
time that students of rhetoric bend their skills to an
analysis of scientific discourse and the creation of
scientific knowledge" (143). In this study I shall answer
Overington's call to students of rhetoric and attempt to
contribute to what Halloran called a need for "a body of
critical literature on particular cases of scientific
discourse" (81) by applying a working method of rhetorical
analysis to a modern scientific controversy.
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The particular case I have selected for study came to 
the public's attention on March 23, 1989. On that day, 
University of Utah officials held a press conference to 
announce that two of their researchers, Martin Fleischmann 
and Stanley Pons, had made a break-through discovery that 
promised to change the face of the world: sustained cold
nuclear fusion. Using simple apparatus, the two chemists 
had harnessed the power of the sun under room temperature 
using a fuel source literally as abundant as seawater. The 
implications of such a discovery were staggering: a cheap,
limitless source of energy.
Soon, however, the bright promise of the break-through 
discovery was dimmed by controversy and questions: Had
Fleischmann and Pons acted as responsible scientists? Was 
what they observed in the lab actually cold nuclear fusion? 
Why could some scientists report replication while others 
reported finding nothing at all? What was the relationship 
between the scientists of the University of Utah and those 
of rival Brigham Young, who reported a similar discovery? 
And so on.
To establish an understanding of the cold fusion 
process and an appreciation for the implications of the 
Fleischmann/Pons claim, I will first present, in this 
chapter, a brief discussion of the basic mechanics of 
nuclear energy, concluding with an explanation of the type 
of cold fusion that Fleischmann and Pons believe they
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created. Also, I will review the circumstances surrounding 
the Fleischmann/Pons announcement and the events that 
followed in order to establish a context for the resulting 
discourse in the cold fusion controversy. Chapter two 
reviews literature relevant to the rhetorical nature of 
science. Chapter three presents methodology for the 
rhetorical analysis of scientific discourse. Chapter four 
contains the rhetorical analysis of the discourse found in 
the cold fusion controversy, and chapter five discusses the 
implications and conclusions of this study.
The Four Types of Nuclear Energy
The discussion that follows is based on my 
understanding of the nuclear processes after reading 
various sources, including F. David Peat's eloquent and 
accessible explanation of cold fusion, and David H. 
Freedman's article on "hot" fusion.
Nuclear Fission
The form of nuclear energy most of us are already 
familiar with is nuclear fission. This type of nuclear 
energy powers electric generating stations and is the type 
of energy used in the first atom bomb. In the electric 
generating station, the nuclear reaction both is controlled 
and sustained. In the atom bomb, uranium atoms are 
sundered by a brief explosion that results in an immediate 
release of energy.
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In nuclear fission, the nuclei, or centers, of uranium 
atoms are encouraged to split. In this process, a part of 
the mass of the nucleus of the atom is converted into a 
tremendous amount of energy.
Aside from the source of the energy, a nuclear power 
plant operates much like one fueled by coal or oil. The 
heat, in this case generated by splitting uranium nuclei, 
converts water into steam, which in turn propels turbines, 
which in turn generate electricity. Generating electricity 
by using nuclear fission is a cleaner process than burning 
fossil fuels, is not limited by scarcity as are fossil 
fuels, and is commercially viable. A real concern, 
however, is what to do with the highly radioactive waste, 
an unavoidable by-product of nuclear fission.
Nuclear Fusion
Somewhat surprisingly, this type of nuclear energy is 
less familiar but is not an uncommon occurrence. In fact, 
right now more nuclear fusion is taking place than nuclear 
fission. However, the conditions under which nuclear 
fusion occurs takes it out of the realm of everyday 
experience; nuclear fusion powers our sun, as well as 
every other star.
Unlike nuclear fission, in which atomic nuclei are 
split, nuclear fusion is the process wherein two atomic 
nuclei— specifically, two hydrogen nuclei— actually fuse,
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or come together. This fusion, or melding, results in a 
form of helium and a free neutron. These two products of 
nuclear fusion weigh much less than the nuclei which 
combined, and the loss in mass is released as energy, as 
described by Einstein's famous formula, E = me2. Simply 
put, the energy released is equal to the loss in mass, 
multiplied by the square of the speed of light. Since the 
speed of light is 186,000 miles per second, before 
squaring, obviously much energy is released from even the 
smallest incidence of fusion and is far greater than that 
produced by nuclear fission (Freedman).
Encouraging hydrogen nuclei to fuse is difficult. At 
the core of a star, the combination of crushing gravity and 
incredible temperatures cause hydrogen nuclei to overcome 
atomic forces, which normally cause them to repel one 
another due to their like positive charges, and fuse.
Efforts are underway, however, to duplicate and 
harness the conditions and reactions that power the sun. 
Obviously, the engineering and theoretical obstacles are 
many. The basic challenges are heating the hydrogen atoms 
to millions of degrees and then holding them closely enough 
together for a long enough time to increase the probability 
that the atoms will collide and fuse.
Attempts at creating "hot" nuclear fusion have 
resulted in the construction of the tokamak, a room—sized, 
stainless-steel, donut—shaped chamber, into which is pumped
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plasma—  hydrogen gas so hot that the electrons are 
stripped free from their atoms, resulting in a hot soup of 
swirling, colliding nuclei and electrons. Of course, the 
walls of the tokamak would melt if they came into contact 
with the plasma cloud— which has been heated to a record 
670 million degrees at the Princeton tokamak (Freedman 
32)— so powerful electric fields inside the tokamak act as 
a sort of "magnetic bottle" (Peat 32) to suspend the plasma 
within while it is heated even further.
To facilitate fusion, an isotopic form of hydrogen is 
used, deuterium. Deuterium is actually a naturally 
occurring element, relatively abundant in sea and drinking 
water: about 1 in every 6,700 hydrogen atoms exist as
deuterium (Peat 25). Whereas a hydrogen molecule consists 
of one proton in the nucleus orbited by one electron (the 
simplest elemental configuration), deuterium consists of a 
nucleus of one proton and one neutron orbited by a single 
electron. Chemically, deuterium is identical to hydrogen 
in the way it behaves and interacts with other elements. 
However, the extra neutron plays an important role in 
forming the by-products of fusion, helium and the free 
neutron, which weigh less than the two deuterium atoms.
This "lost" mass is converted into energy as described 
above. Deuterium figures prominently in the following 
discussions of "cold" nuclear fusion.
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Muon Catalyzed Cold Nuclear Fusion
In July, 1987, Johann Rafelski and Steven E. Jones 
(the same Steven Jones who figures in the cold fusion 
controversy) published an article in Scientific American 
entitled "Cold Nuclear Fusion.” They described a process 
known as "muon catalyzed fusion," also termed "cold 
fusion." Actually, the fusion process is "cold" only when 
compared to the above described process that requires a 
plasma of millions of degrees. The fusion process 
described by Rafelski and Jones actually works best at 
around 900 degrees Celsius.
A muon is a short-lived, electron—like particle that 
behaves very much like an electron. In muon catalyzed cold 
fusion, muons are fired into a gas of deuterium and 
tritium, which is also an isotopic form of hydrogen with 
two protons and one neutron in the nucleus orbited by a 
single electron. Tritium, unlike hydrogen and deuterium, 
however, is highly radioactive and decays relatively 
quickly. As the muon travels through the deuterium/tritium 
gas, it collides with orbiting electrons and will 
eventually displace an orbiting electron, knocking it 
aside, much like the collision between billiard balls. 
However, instead of careening off, the muon is captured by 
the nucleus and replaces the electron, taking up an orbit 
around the nucleus.
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One of the important properties of the muon, however, 
is that although it is electron—like, its mass is around 
200 times greater than that of the displaced electron. 
Therefore, it orbits the nucleus around 200 times more 
closely than did the original electron. As a result, the 
nuclei of the deuterium or tritium molecule are brought 
about 200 times closer than normal.
As it turns out in the weird realm described by 
quantum mechanics, there is another way to fuse nuclei.
One way, described above, is to accelerate through super­
heating the nuclei while they are in close proximity, as in 
the plasma. The fast-moving nuclei collide and thus fuse. 
Another, less violent method involves holding nuclei very 
close for an extended time. During this time, there is a 
probability that a phenomenon known as "quantum tunneling" 
will take place.
Due to quantum uncertainty, and as described by Werner 
Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle, "there is an intrinsic 
ambiguity in pinning down the specifications of a nucleus" 
(Peat 46). Normally, nuclei find themselves on opposite 
sides of a barrier that works to keep them apart. However, 
because of this "intrinsic ambiguity" concerning the 
location of a nucleus, there exists a small probability 
that a nucleus held in close proximity to another for an 
extended time may actually find itself on the other side of 
the repulsion barrier. Thus, through quantum tunneling, a
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nucleus may pass through the barrier of repulsion, at which 
point the atomic force that binds and holds together nuclei 
takes over, causing the nuclei to fuse.
Though muon catalyzed cold fusion holds promise to one 
day provide a viable commercial energy source, several 
problems must be overcome. One problem lies in the short 
life span of the muon, which lasts only for about two 
millionths of a second. Another lies in the fact that 
creating the muons requires more energy than is produced 
thus far in the reaction chamber. Still another problem 
lies in the number of fusions that a single (short-lived) 
muon can catalyze. Rafelski and Jones observe that 
"pioneering research in physics tends to precede 
applications beneficial to society by one or two 
generations" (89). Even though a promise, then, muon 
catalyzed fusion remains a distant one.
Given the theoretical, technological, and practical 
problems associated with both nuclear fission and nuclear 
fusion, it is little wonder that Fleischmann and Pons's 
announcement of successfully generating and maintaining 
fusion reactions in a laboratory test tube at room 
temperatures caused such a stir among the scientific and 
lay community. Following is a description of another 
method, the Fleischmann and Pons method, of cold nuclear 
fusion.
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Electrochemicallv Induced Cold Nuclear Fusion
This method is deceptively modest. Its basis is the 
same process used in many high school chemistry labs for 
producing hydrogen gas: simple electrolysis.
In the high school lab, two electrodes are submersed 
in water a small distance apart. When a current is run 
through the electrodes, the water is reduced to its basic 
constituents, hydrogen and oxygen. The oxygen moves to one 
electrode while the hydrogen moves to the other, both to 
bubble off. In the high school lab, the hydrogen is 
collected (and then ignited to demonstrate the 
combustibility of the gas). This process is exactly that 
used by Fleischmann and Pons, but with different apparatus.
The electrodes in this case consist of platinum and 
palladium. Palladium is important to the process because 
of its atomic structure and its affinity for absorbing 
hydrogen before it can bubble away. These electrodes are 
submersed into deuterized water, D20; that is, water 
composed mostly of deuterium molecules instead of normal 
hydrogen molecules, H20. The oxygen travels to the 
platinum electrode while the deuterium travels to and is 
absorbed into the open lattice work structure of the 
palladium electrode. Simply put, the electrolysis 
continues, packing more and more deuterium into the atomic 
structure of the palladium. Soon, the deuterium nuclei are 
packed so tightly by the galvanic pressure for an extended
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time that quantum tunneling takes place, resulting in cold 
fusion of the deuterium nuclei. As in other fusion 
processes, the products of this cold fusion are light 
helium and a free neutron, along with a tremendous amount 
of heat energy, all of which become important in 
discussions about whether Fleischmann and Pons had actually 
achieved what they claimed.
Following is a timeline of events surrounding 
Fleischmann and Pons's announcement of cold nuclear fusion, 
adapted, updated, and expanded from a timeline developed by 
Peat (180-182). Many of the events described here are 
referred to in chapter four as they relate to the rhetoric 
surrounding the scientific discourse concerning cold 
fusion. The articles for the rhetorical analysis in 
chapter four are identified in the timeline by bold-faced 
type and full bibliographic information.
Cold Fusion Timeline
August 192 6 • Paneth and Peters, two German researchers,
cause a stir among physicists by publishing 
a paper reporting the creation of helium 
from hydrogen using a palladium catalyst 
(recall that helium is a by-product of 
fusion). Though nuclear fusion was an 
unknown process at the time, the conversion
12
of hydrogen into helium would have proved a 
valuable discovery.
April 1927 • Paneth et al. retract the claim, having
underrated two sources of error involving 
helium contamination: glass heated in a 
hydrogen atmosphere yields up absorbed 
helium, and palladium heated in the presence 
of hydrogen, but not oxygen, readily 
releases helium.
March 24, 1951 • Argentine dictator Juan Peron, along with
physicist Ronald Richter, calls a press 
conference, announcing to the world that 
Argentina had succeeded in controlling 
nuclear fusion. Eighteen months later,
Peron realized he had been hoaxed; Richter 
was reportedly arrested after having spent 
$70 million (Waters).
1972 • Three University of Utah scientists make
headlines when they report the creation of 
an X—ray laser, a project that had baffled 
many researchers for years. No known 
physical process existed to explain the 
phenomenon, and the laser effect worked only 
about one time out of ten: some scientists
reported confirmation while others observed 





skepticism. Later, researchers discovered 
the evidence was created by an altogether 
unrelated effect. Physicists laughingly 
have termed such situations the "Utah 
Effect" {Pool 420) .
• Steven Jones of Brigham Young University 
co-authors a paper, "Cold Nuclear Fusion," 
published in Scientific American. Jones 
describes a process of muon catalyzed cold 
fusion and situates himself in cold fusion 
research.
• Martin Fleischmann and Stanley Pons apply 
for a Department of Energy grant for funds 
to continue their cold fusion research 
(their process is described above), having 
already invested $100,000 of their own money 
into the research (Dagani).
• Steven Jones acts as one of the reviewers 
for the Fleischmann and Pons grant. He 
approaches Fleischmann and Pons through the 
Department of Energy about collaboration 
because his own work overlaps significantly 
with theirs. Jones's approach was to 
duplicate the conditions of the earth's 
interior instead of the sun's.




by-product of nuclear fusion) around 
volcanoes and oceanic fissures suggested to 
Jones that the heat of the earth's core was 
the result of nuclear fusion. Jones and 
coworkers' experiments dealt with "low- 
voltage electrolytic infusion of deuterons 
into metallic titanium or palladium 
electrodes" (Jones et al, "Observation" 737) 
that are emersed in a soup of eight metallic 
salts, such as those found in the earth's 
interior.
Additionally, Jones offers Fleischmann 
and Pons the use of a highly sensitive 
neutron detection device (recall that 
neutron release is also a fusion by­
product) . The device, of his own design, is 
the only one of its kind. No agreement 
concerning collaboration is reached.
1989
• Jones decides he is ready to publish his 
results.
• Fleischmann and Pons, along with the 
president of the University of Utah, meet 
with Jones and the president of BYU. 








eighteen months to work on their project, 
but both parties agree to publish their work 
by submitting papers simultaneously to 
Nature on March 24.
10 • Pons speaks with the U.S. editor of the 
Journal of Electroanalytical Chemistry about 
a manuscript of the cold fusion paper.
11 • Pons mails the manuscript.
17 • University of Utah press'officials
interview Fleischmann and Pons about their 
cold fusion experiments.
22 • University of Utah officials announce a
major press conference for the next day.
23 • Fleischmann and Pons announce their
discovery of cold fusion at a press 
conference in Salt Lake City.
• After hearing at the press conference that 
Fleischmann and Pons had prepared a 
manuscript, Jones and his team of BYU 
researchers submit their manuscript to 
Nature.
24 • Fleischmann and Pons submit their own
paper to Nature and express irritation with 






• A Brigham Young University press release 
announces the independent discovery of cold 
fusion by Jones.
31 • Fleischmann meets with a group of
physicists at the European Center for 
Nuclear Research (CERN) near Geneva, 
Switzerland, to explain cold fusion. He is 
well received.
• In the following weeks, a flurry of press 
releases, faxed reports, e-mail messages, 
and rumors from labs all over the world, 
including Stanford and Texas A & M, appear 
to confirm cold fusion. But soon research 
groups report negative results in which they 
claim to have seen nothing.
7 • The Utah State Legislature, in a special
session, passes the Fusion/Energy Technology 
Act. Governor Norm Bangerter requests the 
state to release $5 million in research 
funds.
10 • The Journal of Electroanalvtical
Chemistry publishes a "Preliminary note, 1 
the Fleischmann and Pons article about their 
cold fusion experiments (Fleischmann, Martin 
and Stanley Pons. "Electrochemically 
Induced Nuclear Fusion of Deuterium."
17
Journal of Electroanalvtical Chemistry 261
(1989): 301—308). Though the article is 
brief and contains little information about 
apparatus and none about control 
experiments, journal editor W. Ronald 
Fawcett says that the article is "a very 
important piece of science... definitely 
worth publishing as a preliminary 
communication" (Dagani 14).
April 12 • Pons delivers a lecture, "Nuclear Fusion
in a Test Tube?" to around 7,000 chemists at 
an American Chemical Society national 
meeting in Dallas. Clayton Callis, ACS 
president, remarks that physicists' attempts 
at hot fusion were "too expensive and too 
ambitious....Now it appears that chemists 
have come to the rescue" ("Scientific" 605). 
Pons is mobbed by reporters and has to 
change motels.
April 17 • Pons announces a fusion reaction sustained
for 800 hours in one of his cells.
April 18 • Italian researchers from Frascati announce
cold fusion of a different kind, in which 
deuterium gas is pumped into titanium metal 
under high pressure.•
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April 20 • Nature explains that Jones' paper,
received March 23, would be published the 
next week but that Fleischmann and Pons's, 
received March 27, would not. The 
Fleischmann and Pons article received by 
Nature is a brief version of that which 
earlier appeared in the Journal of 
Electroanalvtical Chemistry. Asked to amend 
their text in response to reviewer's 
questions, Fleischmann and Pons decline in 
order to "satisfy more urgent work." Nature 
states that "the non- appearance of the 
article must not be taken to imply that the 
experiments...by Fleischmann and Pons are 
inherently less believable than those of 
Jones et al" ("Cold Fusion in Print" 604).
April 26 • Fleischmann, Pons, and Jones appear before
the House Science, Space, and Technology 
Committee. University of Utah President 
Chase N. Peterson encourages the 
organization of a national cold fusion 
center with an initial investment of $100 
million. He also requests from the federal 
government $25 million in seed money.
April 27 • Jones and coworkers' cold fusion paper
appears in Nature (Jones, S. E., at al.
19
"Observation of Cold Nuclear Fusion in 
Condensed Matter." Nature 338 (1989): 737 — 
740). In that same issue, Nature editor John 
Maddox lashes out at Fleischmann and Pons, 
saying their claim "is literally unsupported 
by the evidence" (Maddox, John. "What to 
say about cold fusion." Nature 338 (1989): 
701) .
May 1—2 • The American Physical Society holds
special late-night sessions at the spring 
meeting in Baltimore. Physicist Steven 
Koonin is applauded after he remarks that 
the excess heat observed by Fleischmann and 
Pons is more an indication of "incompetence, 
perhaps delusion" than cold fusion (Lindley 
4). Vocal critic Nathan Lewis, of the 
California Institute of Technology, and W. 
Meyerhof, of Stanford, attack Fleischmann 
and Pons on the grounds of poor calorimetry 
and data interpretation. The poor 
calorimetry results from Fleischmann and 
Pons's failure to stir the liquid in their 
fusion cells during temperature sampling. 
Jones' claims, however, are well received, 
due in part to his more modest claims of 
neutron output and his ability to gather
sensitive neutron flux measurements with the 
detector that he designed. Fleischmann and 
Pons do not attend. The "physicists 
attending were left with the comfortable 
feeling that fusion was dead, except for the 
small effects of the sort claimed by the 
Brigham Young group" (Lindley 4).
• The American Electrochemical Society 
warmly receives the news of cold fusion at 
its meeting in San Diego.
• A damaging criticism of the gamma—ray 
spectra collected by Fleischmann and Pons 
appears in the "Scientific Correspondence" 
section of Nature (Petrasso, R.D., et al. 
"Problems with the y-ray spectrum in the 
Fleischmann et al. experiments." Nature 
339 (1989) 183-185).
• A cold fusion workshop organized by the 
Department of Energy and held at Los Alamos 
National Laboratory is attended by 
scientists from all over the world and is 
carried by satellite across North America. 
Fleischmann and Pons are absent. Both 
negative and positive results are presented, 
and the scientists fail to reach a definite 






• Scientists announce at a press conference 
in Harwell, UK that, following extensive 
experimentation, they failed to establish 
evidence of cold fusion. They are 
abandoning their experimentations.
• An interim report from the Department of 
Energy states, "The experiments reported to 
date do not present convincing evidence that 
useful sources of energy will result from 
the phenomena attributed to cold fusion." 
Fleischmann and Pons respond in the 
"Scientific Correspondence" section of 
Nature to the criticisms of their gamma—ray 
spectra by Petrasso, et al. that appeared in 
the May 18th issue of Nature (Fleischmann, 
Martin and Stanley Pons. "Measurement of y— 
rays from cold fusion." Nature 339 (1989) 
667). In this same section, Petrasso et al. 
reply to the Fleischmann and Pons letter 
(Petrasso, et al. "Petrasso et al. reply." 
Nature 339 (1989) 667-669).
• The state of Utah disburses $5 million to 
establish a National Cold Fusion Institute 
there.
16-18 • A workshop entitled "Anomalous Effects in
Deuterized Materials," sponsored by the
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National Science Foundation and the Electric 
Power Research Institute, results in a 
relatively positive report concerning cold 
fusion and recommends that fxirther study is 
justified.
November 12 • The Department of Energy issues a final,
skeptical report on cold fusion: "The panel 
concludes that the present evidence for the 
discovery of a new nuclear process termed 
cold fusion is not persuasive." The word 
"persuasive" was chosen deliberately, 
remarked co-chair Norman F. Ramsey. "That's 
not to say it's untrue" (Goodwin 45).
December • Both the Bhabha Atomic Research Center in
India and scientists in Japan report 
positive cold fusion results.
1990
January 1 • Pons begins extensive new experimentation
involving sixty—four cold fusion cells.
February 1 • Fritz G. Will is named head of the
National Cold Fusion Institute.
March 28—31 • The first annual Cold Fusion Conference is
conducted in Salt Lake City.
March 29 • A paper in Nature reports that independent
measurements taken on Pons's cells produced
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no confirmation of a nuclear reaction. In 
that same issue appears an editorial, 
"Farewell (not fond) to cold fusion," 
comparing the search for cold fusion to that 
for the Philosopher's Stone.
July • Fleischmann and Pons's article,
"Calorimetric Measurements of the Palladium/ 
Deuterium System: Fact and Fiction,"
appears in the Journal of Fusion Technology 
(Pons, Stanley and Martin Fleischmann. 
"Calorimetric Measurements of the 
Palladium/Deuterium System: Fact and
Fiction." Journal of Fusion Technology 17
(1990): 669-679.) In this article, Pons and 
Fleischmann answer many specific criticisms.
Statement of Purpose
The cold fusion controversy promises a unique 
opportunity for a case study of scientific discourse and 
the way in which scientists rely on rhetoric in the "doing 
of science." This study of the cold fusion controversy 
argues against Herbert W. Simon's statement that scientific 
discourse is rhetorical only in the "softer" sciences such 
as social psychology. No "evidence of a pattern of 
sophistic practices within the better established sciences 
such as physics or chemistry" has been offered, he says
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(126). However, the process of cold fusion uniquely 
bridges the "hard" disciplines of particle, atomic, and 
nuclear physics and electrochemistry.
Additionally, the cold fusion controversy presents an 
excellent opportunity to examine the extent to which an 
understanding of the context surrounding scientific 
discourse may enrich a study of scientific rhetoric.
I will attempt to answer the following questions by 
analyzing the discourse surrounding the cold fusion 
controversy: To what extent might a rhetorical analysis of
the cold fusion discourse increase our understanding of the 
controversy? How successful as rhetors were Fleischmann 
and Pons in convincing their audience of the scientific 
reasonableness of their claims of cold fusion? To what 
extent and in what ways do scientists' attitudes, values, 
and assumptions manifest themselves in the discourse of the 
controversy? And finally, what may be learned about 
scientific discourse in general by examining the cold 
fusion controversy in particular?
Chapter Two: Review of the Literature
Traditionally, scientific discourse has not been 
considered a text for rhetorical evaluation. The classical 
tradition maintains a strict dichotomy between science and 
rhetoric. Aristotle argued that science dealt with 
demonstrably true certainties, whereas rhetoric dealt with 
matters of opinion, or the uncertain. James Kelso suggests 
that rhetoricians have disregarded a rhetorical aspect of 
scientific discourse based on conclusions drawn from 
Aristotle: science is not open to deliberation, and the 
certainties of the natural world are distinct from the 
contingencies of human convention. Kelso maintains that 
rhetoricians have traditionally failed to realize that 
scientific theories may be considered symbolic 
representations of reality (28).
In the following sections, I will review 
representative scholarship from the philosophy, rhetoric, 
and sociology of science, and examine an emerging 
discipline known as the rhetoric of inquiry. The 
discussion of these disciplines will demonstrate how the 
rhetoric of science is bound to and draws upon each: in
their communicative practices, scientists draw on knowledge 
of how science operates, how scientists interact, and how 
scientists conduct inquiry. Finally, I briefly address the 
epistemological implications of a rhetoric of science. In
25
26
each, of these sections,. I show that persuasive discourse is 
an integral component of scientific practice.
The Philosophy of Science
The past thirty years have seen an active exchange of 
views among the modern philosophers of science, ranging 
from the highly rational, empirically based views of 
science of Sir Karl Popper to what has been called the 
irrational, "mob rule" view of scientific activity held by 
Thomas Kuhn. Despite much debate among the philosophers 
of science, there is no consensus concerning which 
theoretical approach in the philosophy of science is the 
best to pursue to accomplish two goals: to provide a 
framework for the further development of effective 
scientific theories and to provide a model that scientists 
may follow to ensure that their theoretical pursuits will 
result in the best contribution to scientific knowledge. 
While the views of the major philosophers of science differ 
greatly, all the views may be reconciled with the notion 
that scientific communication is rhetorical. The 
philosophies I review here include those of Sir Karl Popper 
and his theory of falsificationism, Imre Lakatos and his 
method of the scientific research program, and Thomas Kuhn 
and his theory involving paradigms, normal science, and 
revolution in the development of scientific theories.
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Sir Karl Popper is a most influential philosopher of 
science, and perhaps the champion of the rational approach. 
Conjectures and Refutations, originally published in 1962, 
gives the foundation for his method of falsification, and 
Objective Knowledge, revised in 1979, presents his 
epistemic theories concerning scientific practice.
Rejecting from the beginning the notion of theory 
verification, Popper asserts that the falsification of 
theories is the only rational procedure for developing 
scientific theory. Popper agrees with philosopher David 
Hume, who casts much doubt on induction, asserting that no 
argument may establish
'that those instances, of which we have had no 
experience, resemble those, of which we have had 
experience.' Consequently, 'even after the 
observation of the frequent or constant 
conjunction of objects, we have no reason to draw 
any inference concerning any object beyond those 
of which we have had experience...why from this 
experience we form any conclusion beyond those 
past instances, of which we have had experience.'
(Conjectures 42)
Therefore, verifying a theory is impossible because one 
cannot logically conclude that because past tests have 
confirmed a theory, future tests will do so likewise.
At this point, both Hume and Popper are left with an 
important problem: if induction is illogical, how then do
we account for our amassing knowledge? How is our 
knowledge obtained? Popper suggests that we actively try 
to impose regularities upon the world. We try to discover 
similarities in it and to interpret it in terms of laws
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invented by us. Without waiting for premises, we jump to
conclusions. These may have to be discarded later, should
observation show that they are wrong.
This was a theory of trial and error— of 
conjectures and refutations....conjectures boldly 
put forward for trial, to be eliminated if they 
clashed with observations; with observations 
which were rarely accidental but as a rule 
undertaken with the definite intention of testing 
a theory by obtaining, if possible, a decisive 
refutation. (Conjectures 4 6)
The scientist, then, should proceed as follows: state a
theory that may be tested through observation and name
before any testing the conditions or outcomes by which the
theory may be considered as falsified, or refuted. Naming
the conditions beforehand that will falsify the theory
demarcates, for Popper, the scientific theory from the
pseudo—scientific (some theories, such as some astrological
theories, can never really be said to be true or false, for
it is difficult to name precise conditions under which such
theories may be said to be wrong or false) and establishes
a rational means of scientific progress based on integrity
and disallowing any ad hoc adjustments to make theories
coincide with observed data.1 Thus, Popper's method
places much importance on the critical experiment, that
Copper recognizes that a theory may always be 
adjusted to make it fit experimental outcomes. Ad hoc 
adjustments are those that allow the theory to escape 
refutation without adding any empirical or predictive 
content, that is, counters experimental refutation but does 
nothing to increase the theory's predictive power or expand 
its set of logical consequents. This idea of excess 
content is also significant in Lakatos's philosophy.
particular, crucial test that may either help confirm or
falsify a theory.
Popper's method of science, therefore, offers a
rational means to proceed with the development of
scientific theories while recognizing problems with
verificationism. Popper's views on falsification raise
some interesting questions on the function and nature of
rhetoric should one implement his proposed method of
science. The exchange of critical discourse between
scientists is an essential element of Popper's method of
conjectures and refutations. States Popper,
Faced with a certain problem, the scientist 
offers, tentatively, some sort of solution— a 
theory. This theory science accepts only 
provisionally, if at all; and it is most 
characteristic of the scientific method that 
scientists spare no pains to criticize and test 
the theory in question. Criticizing and testing 
are complimentary activities; scientists 
criticize the theory from many sides to reveal 
weaknesses. (Conjectures 313)
The rational aspect of this process enters in when these
vulnerable points are subjected to the severe scrutiny of
scientific testing. Ultimately, for Popper, the process
not one ruled by rhetoric or argument, but rather by
scientists basing their theories and accepted knowledge o:
good reasons, good reasons derived by the refutation or
confirmation of theories based soundly in experimental
30
outcome and observation.2 Yet, one sees the obvious 
problem of denying the role of rhetoric considering 
Popper's reliance on critical discourse. Obvious questions 
arise when one asks "Which of these good reasons is the 
best reason?" and perhaps more significantly when one asks, 
"When are the conditions of falsification met: how much 
refutation is enough and how does one prove or communicate 
this refutation?" As shown in the timeline presented in 
chapter one, for example, many scientists reported 
confirmation of Fleischmann and Pons's findings while many 
others found no evidence of cold fusion. While it may be 
possible to pursue a method of falsification as Popper 
suggests, just when the actual theory has been falsified 
returns to the realm of critical discourse; the ultimate 
decision by the scientific community then must rest not 
only on rational experimental outcome but, ultimately, upon 
how one presents these outcomes through critical discourse 
and communication.
Marilyn Schauer Samuels suggests further implications 
of Popper's method on the rhetoric of scientific 
communication in her article "Technical Writing and the
2This idea of "good reasons" will play a central role 
in the method of analysis discussed in chapter 3. The good 
reasons are in part the set of values and norms established 
by a community of scientists by which they critically judge 
discourse. I will suggest that how well or how poorly 
particular discourse addresses these good reasons (the 
rhetorical element of discourse) influences success or 
failure of theories.
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Recreation of Reality." Her thesis is that technical 
writing is a more creative venture than is commonly 
thought, and that when writing, technical writers create 
their particular versions of reality.
Though Samuels slightly misrepresents Popper, her 
conclusion is nonetheless valid. Popper does not, as she 
suggests, advocate the "falsiflability of reality," but, 
more precisely, the falsification of theories about 
reality, for Popper advocates an objective reality revealed 
through experimentation when our theories are falsified. 
Also, Popper does not "advocate the on-going revisions of 
reality as the aim of science," but rather that truth— in 
the ultimate, objective sense— is the aim of science, and 
that we move closer to that truth by uncovering the points 
in our theories where an objective reality asserts itself 
by disproving conjectures about its nature. Samuels is 
correct, however, in concluding that our conjectures and 
refutations will result in an evolving depiction of 
reality. Scientists, as do the technical writers in her 
thesis, depict their own versions of reality when positing 
theories and debating these versions through critical 
discourse.
Closely related to these ideas are the themes of 
Popper's Objective Knowledge, which demonstrate the 
scientific statement's significance in the practice of 
science. By objective knowledge, Popper does not mean
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knowledge produced without bias or subjectivity. Rather, 
for Popper, the scientific statement exists independently 
of a knower, just as a collection of books in a library 
exists independently of a reader. Further, this knowledge 
would continue to exist even after humanity or anyone else 
who could read it had long since vanished; so too does the 
body of scientific statements exist. These statements have 
an existence independent of reality, and it is upon this 
body of knowledge that we apply our experimentations and 
scrutinies.
It is not reality, then, that is subject to 
falsifiability, but, as Charles Bazerman points out, it is 
the scientific statement or theory that becomes the object 
of scrutiny upon which critical operations may be performed 
and the method of falsifiability applied (Scientific 
Writing 159). The implication is, as suggested, that 
Popper's method of falsifiability is not applied to 
reality; it is removed one step from the critical 
operations and direct observations of the laboratory and 
experimentation and applied to the scientific statement 
itself. Thus, the significance of the scientific statement 
is revealed in .Popper's method.
Another widely read and influential philosopher of 
science is Imre Lakatos. His "Methodology of Scientific 
Research Programmes" outlines another rational approach to 
the development of scientific theories and knowledge.
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Lakatos disagrees with. Popper on some fundamental points, 
but builds his methodolgy on the idea of
falsificationism— of a particular sort— and the particular 
application of this method, not to a single theory, but to 
a series of theories, or research program.
Lakatos maintains that it is unreasonable that a 
scientist would abandon a theory because some observational 
facts contradict it. There must be some greater reason for 
the scientist to abandon one theory for another. Lakatos 
suggests that scientists move on to other theories only 
when a better theory— "better" as defined by predicting 
novel facts and possessing excess content— is offered. For 
Lakatos, there is no falsification before the emergence of 
a better theory (35). Until that time, scientists will 
continue testing the current theory. The problem is 
shifted, then, from one of appraising theories to 
appraising a series of theories, or research program. 
Lakatos maintains that great scientific achievements are 
not outcomes based on hypotheses but on scientific research 
programs.
A research program is built around two types of 
heuristics. The negative heuristic, or "hard core," forms 
the set of major, underlying assumptions that are no longer 
tested by scientists because such tests no longer yield 
novel results. For instance, a research program may be 
established around Newton's three laws of motion. The
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three laws themselves are unquestioned, so experiments that 
test the three laws would not be considered fruitful 
experimentation. The positive heuristic constitutes the 
set of auxiliary hypotheses surrounding the hard core and 
functions as a sort of "protective belt." For instance, if 
a theory predicts outcome 0 and ~0 occurs, the positive 
heuristic is adjusted; the assumptions of the negative 
heuristic are not questioned. It is possible that the 
positive heuristic may in this manner undergo a problem 
shift, scientists in the program focusing on different 
research questions while maintaining the negative heuristic 
as the guide to valid research (48-49).
Programs that yield theories which predict novel facts 
or even generate new problems for investigation he terms 
progressive research programs. Programs that generate 
theories which lack the ability to predict novel facts and 
only accommodate previously unknown facts are termed 
degenerative research programs. Thus, progressive programs 
are characterized by predictive power, degenerative 
programs by only explanatory power. Research programs 
survive despite the rise of anomalies so long as they can 
generate new problems. When the program struggles simply 
to explain anomalies, scientists begin to follow more 
promising programs. Thus, scientific progress is realized 
not through falsification (because anomalies accompany any
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theory) but by progressive programs replacing degenerative 
ones.
Still, the importance of discourse and the rhetorical
implications remain inherent in Lakatos's philosophy. As
Bazerman suggests,
In order to communicate the point and value of 
new work, the scientific writer would be well 
advised to understand how his or her new 
contribution fits within the continuity of the 
problems of the relevant research program. If 
Lakatos is right, adherence to accepted theory is 
not so necessary for an article's gaining 
acceptance as is adherence to the current 
research program....Thus an article that expands 
a field's problems or redirects the research 
program is more consequential for the development 
of a science than the critical experiment that 
would presumably falsify one theory and verify a 
competing theory. (Scientific Writing 160)
To ensure success, then, scientific writers should learn
strategies for demonstrating that their work is in line
with the current program while showing explicitly how their
work opens new lines of investigation and thought. Papers
that are interpretative in purpose, suggesting new
explanations for known anomalies, should be especially well
received. However, interpretative papers that question the
negative heuristic would be less well received.
Scientists' reluctance to radically shift lines of
thought or investigation is revealed in the rhetorical
analysis of the cold fusion discourse, as well as evidence
that scientists resist interpretations that require an
adjustment to the negative heuristic. Part of Fleischmann
and Pons's lack of success in their handling of cold fusion
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may be attributed to their failing to successfully convince 
their audience that their evidence demonstrated a need to 
re-think current fusion knowledge and lines of 
investigation.
Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 
is perhaps the most popular account of scientific 
philosophy, particularly among humanities scholars. This 
popularity is due in part to Kuhn's likening the 
development of science to that of other, more humanistic 
fields. He describes scientific development "as a 
succession of tradition—bound periods punctuated by non— 
cumulative breaks" (Structure 208). Thus, Kuhn presents a 
revolutionary view of science based on his idea of the 
disciplinary matrix.
Kuhn agrees with Popper in that much of science 
proceeds by putting forth hypotheses that are 
systematically tested in attempts to falsify them.
However, Kuhn terms such a view "a virtual cliche" ("Logic" 
4). Though such hypothesis testing constitutes "the 
activity in which most scientists inevitably spend almost 
all their time" (Structure 6), Kuhn extends the notion by 
placing such testing within a particular social structure 
in the community of scientists and describing it as a 
particular type of scientific activity.
Particular communities of scientists are united by 
assumptions that the scientists have some idea of how the
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world works (Structure 5), what Kuhn terms the disciplinary 
matrix, "disciplinary, because it is common to the 
practitioners of a specified discipline; matrix, because it 
consists of ordered elements which require individual 
specification" 3 ("Logic" 271). The disciplinary matrix 
includes "shared symbolic generalizations;... shared 
models;...[and] shared values" ("Logic" 271-72). The 
disciplinary matrix defines a particular scientific 
community or specialty and also defines valid research 
problems and methods for solving those problems.
Thus, scientists involved in a particular community 
spend most of their time practicing "normal science," that 
is,
research firmly based upon one or more past 
scientific achievements that some particular 
scientific community acknowledges for a time as 
supplying the foundation for its further 
practice. (Structure 10)
Kuhn has likened this period of normal science, that is,
the typical procedure of scientists, to puzzle—solving.
Unlike Lakatos, Kuhn believes that "the most striking
feature of... normal research problems... is how little they
3Kuhn coined the term "disciplinary matrix" as a 
replacement for his term "paradigm," used in The Structure 
of Scientific Revolutions. Masterman criticized Kuhn's use 
of the term paradigm, counting "not less than twenty-one 
different senses" in which the term was used (Masterman 
61). Kuhn's switch to disciplinary matrix was intended to 
"unravel confusions...that are entirely of my own making" 
(Kuhn, Criticism 271). The many senses of the term 
paradigm are subsumed under disciplinary matrix, defined in 
the text above.
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aim to produce major novelties, conceptual or phenomenal" 
(Structure 35). Much of the puzzle—solving work is 
intended to "add to the scope and precision" of the already 
accepted views of the disciplinary matrix (Structure 36).
Because of this puzzle—solving nature of normal 
science, anomalies usually present little threat to the 
disciplinary matrix. Typically, it is the individual 
scientist's own ingenuity, not the current theory or 
disciplinary matrix that is tested. If a particular 
conjecture fails the test, it is the scientist's "own 
ability not the corpus of current science [that] is 
impugned...for in the final analysis it is the individual 
scientist rather than current theory which is tested" 
("Logic" 5). Additionally, normal science progresses 
rapidly because scientists only focus on those "problems 
that only their own lack of ingenuity should keep them from 
solving" (Structure 37).
The puzzle—solving activities of normal science have 
implications for scientific discourse as well. Philosophy 
and many social sciences have been characterized by 
critical discourse among the practitioners, discourse 
concerned with claims, counterclaims, and debates over 
fundamentals ("Logic" 6). However, during normal science 
within a disciplinary matrix, such debate over fundamental 
values and exemplars would be immaterial. According to 
Kuhn,
39
it is precisely the abandonment of critical 
discourse that marks the transition to a science.
Once a field has made that transition, critical 
discourse recurs only at moments of crisis when 
the bases of the field are again in jeopardy.
Only when they must choose between competing 
theories do scientists behave like philosophers. 
("Logic" 6)
In Kuhn's philosophy, not all science, however, is
normal science; such moments of crisis as mentioned above
do indeed arise. These periods he refers to as
revolutions, when one disciplinary matrix is given up in
pursuit of another.
Kuhn explains why this shift occurs:
Sometimes a normal problem, one that ought to be 
solved by known rules and procedures, resists the 
reiterated onslaught of the ablest members of the 
group within whose competence it falls. On other 
occasions a piece of equipment designed and 
constructed for the purpose of normal research 
fails to perform in the anticipated manner, 
revealing an anomaly that cannot, despite 
repeated effort, be aligned with professional 
expectation. In these and other ways, normal 
science repeatedly goes astray. And when it 
does— when, that is, the profession can no longer 
evade anomalies that subvert the existing 
tradition of scientific practice—  then begin the 
extraordinary investigations that lead the 
profession at last to a new set of commitments, a 
new basis for the practice of science. The 
extraordinary episodes...are...scientific 
revolutions. They are the tradition—shattering 
complements to the tradition—bound activity of 
normal science. (Structure 5-6)
Periods of scientific revolution are the consequence of
normal science's puzzle—solving activities. Though the aim
of normal science is not to produce novelties, its
activities are very effective in generating them. As Kuhn
explains,
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normal science leads to a detail of information 
and to a precision of the observation-theory 
match that could be achieved in no other 
way....Without the special apparatus that is 
constructed mainly for anticipated functions, the 
results that lead ultimately to novelty could not 
occur. And even when the apparatus exists, 
novelty ordinarily emerges only for the man who, 
knowing with precision what he should expect, is 
able to recognize that something has gone wrong. 
(Structure 65)
Such revolutions are infrequent, momentous, and associated 
with names such as Copernicus, Newton, and Einstein, each 
of whom's theories "necessitated the community's rejection 
of one time-honored scientific theory in favor of another 
incompatible with it" (Structure 6). This rejection of one 
disciplinary matrix "is always simultaneously the decision 
to accept another, and the judgement leading to that 
decision involves the comparison of both paradigms with 
nature and with each other" (Structure 77).
Additionally, one characteristic of the new 
disciplinary matrix is that its view of the world is 
incompatible with the former matrix. For instance, one 
could not view the solar system as both geo—centric, as did 
Ptolemy, and helio-centric, as did Copernicus; Newton's 
three laws do not describe Einstein's world of relativity. 
Kuhn explains further that in the shift from one matrix to 
another,
words change their meanings or conditions of 
applicability in subtle ways. Though most of the 
same signs are used before and after a 
revolution— e.g. force, mass, element, compound, 
cell— the ways in which some of them attach to 
nature has somehow changed. Successive theories
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are thus, we say, incommensurable. ("Logic" 266—
67)
The implications for rhetorical discourse in Kuhn's 
theory of science are many. Though Kuhn states explicitly 
that "it is precisely the abandonment of critical discourse 
that marks the transition to a science" ("Logic" 6), I 
believe that he refers to debate concerning the shared 
values, assumptions, and exemplars of the disciplinary 
matrix, not the specific outcomes of testing done under 
normal science. Indeed, it is the individual scientist's 
own ingenuity and apparatus that is in doubt when 
conjectures fail. As I demonstrate in chapter three, 
scientists frequently debate whether the correct apparatus 
was used, whether the data were correctly interpreted, 
whether the proper theory was evoked to interpret the data, 
whether the most valid and reliable method was used, and so 
on. These issues might arise when scientists question 
whether the shared values, methods, assumptions, and 
exemplars defined by the disciplinary matrix were applied 
correctly. That is, while the content of the matrix is 
unquestioned, the application of its content may be.
Further, Kuhn suggests that during periods of 
revolution, critical discourse plays a central role, 
scientists behaving much like philosophers as they debate 
the merits of competing matrices. Bazerman observes that 
it is during periods of revolution that the nature of the 
discourse changes most:
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At the height of revolution, writing should take 
on a markedly argumentative, persuasive 
character. There should be clear evidence of 
miscommunication between members of the two 
matrices. The character of writing within a 
disciplinary matrix also should change as it 
loses or gains hold, either entering or leaving a 
period of revolution. Finally...a writer at a 
time of revolution would be wise to direct 
comments not so much at his opponents as at 
uncommitted third parties, such as young 
scientists entering the field; the argument 
should proselytize rather than attempt a 
definitive answer to the opposition. (Scientific 
161- 62)
All three of the above philosophers, Popper, Lakatos, 
and Kuhn, describe science in ways that differ in 
assumptions and epistemology. Popper's rational approach 
of falsificationism; Lakatos' programs of scientific 
research; and Kuhn's theory of normal science governed by 
the disciplinary matrix that evoke periods of revolution 
all demonstrate the importance of scientists' identifying 
relevant issues and addressing them persuasively— that is, 
satisfactorily— in communications with other scientists.
Rhetoric of Science
Much rhetorical scholarship of late has dealt directly 
with the idea that scientific discourse has a rhetorical 
element. In this section I will review some representative 
ideas to establish the current thinking about how 
scientific discourse exhibits rhetorical characteristics.
James A. Berlin identifies several twentieth century 
rhetorical positions, two of which embody the dichotomous
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stances described by Kelso above. Berlin describes the 
first such rhetorical stance as an "objective 
rhetoric...based on a positivistic epistemology." This 
stance appears in twentieth century thinking in what Berlin 
terms "current—traditional rhetoric" (Rhetoric 7). In this 
rhetorical theory, reality exists in a material world, and 
truth is arrived at "through collecting sense data and 
arriving at generalizations." The observer's role is one 
of objectivity, "necessitating the abandonment of social, 
psychological, and historical preconceptions that might 
interfere with the response of the faculties to the 
external world." Truth exists prior to and separately from 
language, which can be either a "distorting mirror" when 
reflecting external reality or, preferably, "a transparent 
device that captures the original experience," objectively 
reproducing truth "conceived exclusively in empirical and 
rational terms, with emotion and persuasion relegated to 
oral discourse" (Rhetoric 8). From this particular stance, 
scientists are viewed as producers of "truth" and 
"scientific fact."
Berlin describes a second rhetorical stance, the New 
Rhetoric, or Epistemic Rhetoric ("Contemporary" 773). In 
this rhetoric, language is present in every element of the 
communicative transaction: "interlocutor, audience, and
material world are all regarded as verbal constructs." In 
this stance, "there is never a division between experience
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and language....All experiences, even the scientific and 
logical, are grounded in language, and language determines 
their content and structure” (Rhetoric 16). Thus, "all 
truths arise out of dialectic, out of the interaction of 
individuals within discourse communities" (Rhetoric 17). 
From this position, scientists are viewed as creators of 
probable knowledge: "knowledge is not simply a static 
entity available for retrieval. Truth is dynamic and 
dialectical, the result of a process" of communication 
("Contemporary" 774). Language, then, plays a central role 
in scientific knowledge because "the elements of the 
communication process.... form the elements that go into the 
very shaping of knowledge" ("Contemporary" 774).
Both the current-traditional and epistemic rhetorics 
make obvious a relationship between epistemological stance 
and a rhetoric of science. The former would seem to 
preclude a rhetorical element in the creation of scientific 
knowledge; the latter opens many possibilities. However, 
as will made more obvious throughout this literature 
review, both the current-traditional and epistemic 
rhetorics can be shown to agree with a model of scientific 
practice that includes a rhetorical element. This 
agreement is discussed explicitly in this chapter's 
treatment of epistemological concerns when it is shown that 
a rhetoric of science can play a central role in creating 
scientific knowledge even while maintaining a realist
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epistemology. One can conclude, then, that a rhetoric of 
science is not an epistemology of science, because a 
rhetoric of science can agree with many epistemological 
stances. The implications of this conclusion are discussed 
at length in chapter five.
Epistemology aside, Herbert W. Simons's verdict is 
that "The donkey [science] is rhetorical through and 
through, but still capable of carrying a heavy load" 
("Rhetors" 126). He points out that in our society, the 
term "rhetoric" has bad connotations, described by words 
like "mere, only, empty, or worse," so scientists 
understandably avoid an association. In the classical, 
non—pejorative sense, however, rhetoric connotes "reason- 
giving activity on judgmental matters about which there can 
be no formal proof" ("Rhetors" 127). This classical sense 
permits and even encourages the concept of rhetoric as good 
reason-giving on matters of judgment.
Simons decides that this latter sense is what 
promoters of science mean by "scientific objectivity" 
("Rhetors" 128). Popper, Simons points out, suggests that 
what sets scientific discourse apart from ordinary rhetors 
is this "error—correcting process of exchange between 
scientists" ("Rhetors" 116). Popper calls for the 
unrestrained criticism of any and all ideas, and so insists 
that theories be stated in a manner in which they can be 
falsified or tested ("Rhetors" 116). Simons concludes,
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then, that the rhetorical practices of scientists are kept
in check by Popper's notion of free criticism.
Simons further observes that the rhetorician also can
aid science in this error-correcting process in serving as
critic of discourse. Simons suggests that
rather than carping at science in general, 
rhetorical critics would be more persuasive were 
they to reserve their slings and arrows for more 
limited and vulnerable targets such as individual 
practitioners or communities in the time-bound 
sense. Of special concern should be willful 
violations of scientific canons, and here critics 
can stand not as enemies of science, but as 
defenders of its time—honored norms. ("Rhetors" 
128-129)
From a perspective "friendly" to science, he concludes that 
"there is also much theoretical work to be done" ("Rhetors" 
129) . In the cold fusion controversy, Fleischmann and Pons 
violated several standards of scientific behavior, such as 
the announcement by press conference rather than peer- 
reviewed medium. How these violations may have contributed 
to the controversy is an important rhetorical concern.
Scholars of rhetoric have found much evidence that 
writers of science employ rhetoric in their communications 
to establish the importance of a line of research, to 
demonstrate how their findings fit with accepted standards 
of investigation, and to undermine opposing theoretical 
interpretations. For example, Carol Reeves, in her study 
of reports in the New England Journal of Medicine that 
announced the discovery of immunodeficiency in homosexual 
patients, found that writers use rhetorical strategies to
emphasize the importance of their claims and suggested 
lines of investigation. The writers she examined first 
established AIDS as a mysterious new phenomenon, presenting 
symptoms that current medical knowledge was unable to 
explain. Later, though, the writers relied on existing 
knowledge to explain the phenomenon, demonstrating that the 
immuno-deficiency caused by the virus was not surprising 
under the circumstances and may in fact be solvable. This 
strategy brings to mind Kuhn's theory, above, in which he 
suggests the appeal that puzzle—solving has for scientists, 
but also the requirement that the puzzle appear solvable 
through the scientists' ingenuity. Reeves further points 
out that establishing and validating a new phenomenon in a 
given community or discipline is an important question for 
rhetorical study. She cites sociologist Robert Merton who 
identifies the "political dimension" involved in the 
competition to be the first to characterize and establish a 
phenomenon: "With varying degrees of intent, groups in
conflict want to make their interpretations the prevailing 
one of how things were and are and will be" (395). This 
political dimension arises in the cold fusion controversy 
as well, for the attempt to be first to lay claim to the 
cold fusion phenomenon is one possible reason why 
Fleischmann and Pons made their initial announcement by 
press conference.
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This theme of competition and its manifestation in 
rhetoric arises again in Andrew J. Weigert's article, "The 
Immoral Rhetoric," and also indicates the relationships 
between the philosophy, sociology, and rhetoric of science. 
He cites Kuhn, who suggests that "the triumph of theory 
depends on the number of practitioners who are persuaded to 
utilize it." Thus, he argues, a theoretical rhetoric 
arises in scientific papers that is aimed at weakening the 
explanatory power of rival theories. For instance, in 
research articles, the literature is selectively reviewed 
to emphasize corroborative findings. The need to persuade 
and answer objections from others in the discipline 
imperceptibly transforms the exponent of a theory into a 
proponent of it. To invest one's intellectual life in the 
exposition of a theory is to communicate an evaluation of 
it. Theoreticians who claimed that their theories were no 
better than others would open themselves to questions 
concerning their reasonableness and credibility within the 
community of scientists. The observing community assumes 
that the scientist believes in the theory; otherwise, why 
would so much time be invested in it? Thus, even the 
exponent of a theory seeks to persuade the readers (113). 
Weigert concludes that "whatever its scientific rationale, 
reconstructed logic functions rhetorically as a form of 
persuasion.... If the reconstructed logic is successful, the
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scientific act is persuasively presented in a way in which 
it did not in fact take place" (113).
In his article "Rhetoric and Science: Notes for a
Distinction," Don Geiger echoes Kelso by suggesting how, 
after the classical stance, that rhetoric and science are 
distinct enterprises, yet can be made complementary to one 
another. In a sense, rhetoric is "a means of communication 
of some value in the solution of certain kinds of social 
problems" (54). Rhetoric is the means of identifying truth 
with feelings; or, as Aristotle suggested, "Rhetoric... is 
essentially the art of giving effectiveness to the truth" 
(54). Science, then, is to find the truth; rhetoric, to 
energize it. "Rhetoric," Geiger contends, "has widened its 
scope, and instead of being regarded as a narrow art of 
persuasion, is now concerned with the proper presentation 
of all knowledge" (54).
David Edge and Nigel C. Gilbert found that scientists 
also use rhetoric to show that their work fits with and 
agrees with current lines of research and knowledge. They 
examined an objectified, quantitative analysis of 
scientific communication called the citation analysis, 
which studies the references used by writers. Though 
citation analysis seems at first to belong more to a 
discussion of the sociology of science, this review of both 
Edge and Gilberts' work will reveal that a quantitative 
analysis of scientific interaction fails in part because of
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the rhetorical nature of scientific discourse, specifically 
a persuasive use of referencing, or citation.
Edge asserts that proponents maintain that "citation 
analysis has been demonstrated to be a valid and valuable 
means of creating accurate historical descriptions of 
scientific fields" (109). Two uses of citation analysis 
are, one, the determination of influence of one or more 
researchers on another researcher. A will cite B and C and 
so on. Such citation indicates that B and C influenced A's 
work. A second use is the determination and identification 
of what Diana Crane has termed "invisible colleges," social 
groups of scientists with similar interests, research 
methods, and aims.
The proponents of citation analysis contend its 
benefit is systematic and objective analysis, one that may 
even eliminate the human element from such analysis. For 
instance, all data found in Science Citations could be 
entered into a computer, which would then be programmed to 
do all the groupings and analysis. Edge criticizes this 
notion of purely objective analysis. For example, by taking 
the analysis out of human hands, a participant's own 
accounts that B's work was not influential on his or her 
own would either have to be ignored or the citation 
analysis would have to be corrected.
Additionally, Edge suggests that there exists both 
formal and informal communication among scientists; that
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is, communication may take place that references do not 
record. The formal communication upon which citation
analysis depends "is the tip of the iceberg" (113) .
Further, Edge raised the issue that a major problem with
citation analysis is the persuasive use of citation, which
Nigel C. Gilbert explores.
Gilbert also examined citation analysis. He 
identifies three uses to which citation analysis has been 
put: using the number of citations a paper or researcher
receives as an indicator of significance or "worth"; 
mapping disciplines or specialties; and constructing 
typologies of varieties of reference and citation by 
content analysis of the citations. Gilbert points out that 
while some interesting contributions have been made by such 
analyses, care should be taken when dealing with such 
because no explicit or accepted theory underlies their use, 
and thus no reasoning exists that can explain why some 
authors cite others. Gilbert offers some ideas, however.
Current explanations about why scientists use citation 
as they do explains inadequately why scientists often cite
1) references that are "negational in character (that is, 
those references to papers which the author wishes to 
challenge or contradict" and 2) references that seem not 
strictly relevant to the author's present research.
However, if one were to consider the scientific article as 
persuasive and assume that the scientist who has obtained
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results he believes to be important and true must convince 
his colleagues of such— and by that share his opinion of 
the value of his work— such questions as the above are more 
satisfactorily answered. Gilbert suggests that references 
help demonstrate the validity and significance of the work 
presented in scientific papers.
To gain recognition for new findings, scientists must 
demonstrate that 1) their work represents an advance on 
past research; 2) their findings relate to current 
research in the field; 3) their work is free of error and 
uses proper theories and techniques; and 4) alternative, 
contradictory hypotheses have been considered and 
discarded. Some of the above are accomplished through 
argument and inference detailed in the body of the paper; 
the latter suggests a clear relationship between scientific 
and persuasive discourse. Citation of references, since 
they have already been incorporated into the body of valid 
knowledge, represents a measure of persuasive support 
(116). It follows that it would be more persuasive to cite 
an accepted paper than to redescribe the research without 
reference to the original paper.
Scientists, then, use those respected papers to 
bolster acceptance, give justification, and demonstrate the 
novelty of their work, as well as indicate how one's own 
work illuminates or solves problems raised by previously 
accepted work (116). Thus, scientists tend only to cite
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papers they decide that their audience will consider
"important and correct" in established fields, even if the
citation is not directly related to one's own work.
Gilbert's arguments recall Lakatos' philosophy, which
suggests that to be successful, scientists must demonstrate
how their work fits into and advances the research program.
Charles Bazerman analyzed research articles dealing
with spectroscopy that appeared from the late 1800's to
present. His most interesting findings were about the
changing epistemology of the articles and how this change
was evident in the rhetoric of the discourse. Bazerman
concludes that
the large-scale trends revealed...are consistent with 
the traditional view that science is a rational, 
cumulative, corporate enterprise, but point out that 
this enterprise is realized only through linguistic, 
rhetorical, and social choices, all with 
epistemological consequences. (Shaping 183)
While early articles focused on methodology, more modern
writing takes on a more interpretative and problem-solving
posture, thus opening the possibilities for scientific
rhetoric.
For example, an 1893 article that Bazerman examined 
employs a rhetoric based on empiricist epistemology. The 
main concern of the article is with methodological 
techniques, which are discussed in great detail (Shaping 
177) .
In 1950, a new style of argument appears that will be 
more fully developed in a 19 60 article: the modelling
approach. Epistemologically, the modelling approach 
recognizes a split between nature and theory, theory being 
a human construction, having no reasonable expectation of 
giving a full or accurate account of nature (Shaping 181) . 
Under this approach, a paper can only propose a model that 
accounts for the data better than other models. In terms 
of argument structure, a modelling article does not present 
a claim at first to be explained, supported, and discussed 
in light of experimental data; instead, once the article 
locates the problem in relevant theory and presents 
appropriate data, only then does it offer its model or 
claim about what apparently occurred in the experiment. 
Results are first presented, then puzzled over. Only after 
the puzzlement is the provisionally best model offered 
(Shaping 181).
Once the argument moves away from notions of absolute 
truth and error, the concept of fit between theory and data 
becomes more important. Thus, 1970 finds articles locating 
their problems in the deteriorating quality of fit between 
theory and data; a new theory gains ground because it 
improves that fit. The experiment is designed to find the 
cause of the discrepancy. The article ends by calling for 
new theory and experimental work (Shaping 181).
By 1980, articles have become increasingly tentative 
about the certainty and epistemological status of their 
claims (Shaping 181). For instance, the spectroscopic
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community became gradually more organized and unified by 
the common bond of theory and theory testing; it relied on 
the common theory to produce experimental problems and 
relied more upon and referred more to each others' work.
"As quantum mechanics became more established, it provided 
a coherent organizing principle for work and argument, and 
the practicing spectroscopist had to attend to the 
relationship between his own work and others "and show how 
his work fit in to the current research program" (Shaping 
181). This concept is central to Imre Lakatos's philosophy 
of science, discussed above, in which programs of research 
flourish when its member scientists identify new avenues of 
thought and investigation.
As theory grew, Bazerman observes, it became apparent 
that it was a construction, separate from the nature it 
described, and this awareness affected argument as well as 
social relations (Shaping 183).
This review of rhetoric of science scholarship reveals 
the importance of rhetoric in the practice of science. For 
example, the rhetoric and philosophy of science are 
strongly linked. Scientists look to the way science 
operates to structure their writing and inform their 
rhetoric, using rhetoric to accomplish important tasks as 
defined by the philosophy of science, such as redirecting 
current lines of thought and research. Also apparent is a 
relationship between epistemology and rhetoric; as Bazeman
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suggests, epistemological assumptions influence and are 
reflected in the rhetoric. Further, the modern sense of 
rhetoric employs a wide applicability, becoming enmeshed 
with the way scientists produce and properly present truth. 
The next section will examine the relationship of the 
rhetoric of science with the sociology of science.
Sociology of Science
The social forces at work within specific scientific 
communities, or specialties, can influence the form, 
content, and dissemination of scientific discourse. 
Discussion of the philosophy of science has suggested the 
importance of scientists' identifying relevant issues and 
addressing them in their discourse. These issues are 
products not only of the philosophical aspects of doing 
science but the social as well. Kuhn's philosophy 
especially emphasized the importance of the shared values 
and assumptions of the disciplinary matrix. This matrix 
may be defined not only philosophically, but also 
sociologically as the values and standards upheld by the 
particular community of scientists. Thus, the idea that 
successful communicators in science must identify and 
address the issues and concerns of the specific community 
is not exclusive to philosophy.
For instance, Medwar discusses the possibility that the 
scientific research article may misrepresent the thoughts
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that gave rise to it (42). The form that the paper takes 
is meant to reflect a particular procedure of scientific 
activity, so that, in effect, it demonstrates to the 
scientific community that the writer actually followed the 
procedure valued by that community (even though the writer 
may not have). He posits that the prototypical research 
article embodies a mistaken, yet pervasive, concept of the 
nature of scientific thought.
For example, the structure of the research article is 
introduction, previous work, methods, results, and then 
discussion. In the results section, for instance, one must 
refrain from discussing the importance of the findings and 
pretend that the mind is an empty vessel ready to receive 
information (a practice which Fleischmann and Pons failed 
to follow, as discussed in chapter four's analysis). In 
the discussion section, the writer must "adopt the 
ludicrous pretense of asking yourself if the information 
you have collected means anything" (42). The underlying 
concept is a scientific process in which generalizations 
grow from simple, unbiased, unprejudiced observation: from 
an unordered collection of data, an orderly, general 
statement will develop.
However, all scientific work begins with an 
expectation— a hypothesis— about the outcome of an inquiry. 
This hypothesis governs the shape of the inquiry, even 
though in their genesis, "hypotheses arrive by guesswork"
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{43). In light of this expectation, some outcomes are 
deemed relevant and others are not; some methods are chosen 
and discarded; and some experiments done rather than 
others. This behavior is apparent in the cold fusion 
experiments by both Fleischmann and Pons and Jones. 
Fleischmann and Pons, as electrochemists, arranged 2 of 
their 4 experiments to measure excess heat while failing to 
look for other kinds of evidence of fusion. Jones, a 
physicist, looked only for neutrons, but one type of fusion 
evidence, using a neutron detector of his own design. 
Apparent in these experimental designs are underlying 
assumptions about relevant experiments and evidence.
Considering this general behavior, Medwar concludes 
that the inductive format of the scientific paper should be 
discarded; the discussion should come first, and then the 
data, and scientists should not be ashamed to admit, as 
they apparently are, "that their hypotheses appeared 
uncharted in their minds," and that they are "imaginative 
and inspirational in character, that they are indeed 
adventures of the mind" (43).
Not only is form influenced by social forces within a 
scientific community, but also content, especially when one 
substitutes the concept "audience" for scientific 
community, as Michael A. Overington has done. His thesis 
is that scientific activity "may be treated rhetorically 
because the construction of scientific knowledge involves
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argumentation before an audience" (144) . Overington posits 
four stages in the production of scientific knowledge that 
link four rhetorical concepts to the sociology of science:
1. The education of young scientists transforms 
them into licensed speakers about matters that 
concern their communities.
2. Scientists engage themselves in research 
situations that are necessary conditions for 
their speech.
3. As a result of their engagement in research, 
scientists construct and publish arguments which offer 
plausible reasons to their audiences for judging the 
conclusions of these persuasions to be valid.
4. Over periods of time scientific audiences 
provide authoritative judgment on the status of 
these arguments as scientific knowledge. (154)
Chapter three discusses the importance of and manner in
which scientific writers, as identified in three, above,
"offer plausible reasons to their audiences for judging the
conclusions of these persuasions to be valid," an argument
essential for a rhetoric of science.
Bazerman suggests that, regarding writing, the
constraints and opportunities provided by the specific
genre and style at any particular time and within a
particular discipline are determined by a collection of
social factors. The individual writer, in making decisions
concerning persuasion, must write within a form that
considers the audience's current expectations of
appropriate writing within that field. These expectations
provide resources as well as constraints, for they provide
guides to the formulation of an argument, and suggest ways
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of presenting material that might not have occurred to the 
writer's imagination otherwise (Shaping 165) .
Bazerman further contends that the conventions of 
writing within a discipline are as much a product of that 
discipline as are its knowledge claims (Shaping 16 6). 
Moreover, since the institutional arrangements of writing 
conventions directly affect the symbolic representations 
that constitute knowledge, writing conventions help create 
the very thing called "knowledge" (Shaping 166). How a 
discipline decides to communicate with itself, what it 
presents as potential contributions to knowledge, and how 
it conceives and argues for those potential contributions 
are essential parts of how a discipline constitutes itself 
in fulfillment of its task of creating knowledge (Shaping 
166) .
Lyne and Howe also suggest that distinct fields of 
discourse exist within the sciences and can complicate 
communication. Because researchers within different 
specialties hold different assumptions, a scientist's 
venture beyond the strictest confines of a research 
specialty will sometimes lead to misunderstanding (133).
Key misunderstandings may arise when writers attempt to 
graft rhetorical constructs of one specialty onto another 
(139). Whether miscommunication between disciplines 
occurred in the cold fusion controversy is an important 
consideration for investigation. Pons and Fleischmann are
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electrochemists; many critics of both the experiments and 
experimenters were nuclear and particle physicists. If 
Lyne and Howe are correct, one would expect to find some 
degree of miscommunication between members of the different 
specialties. This question is explored in—depth in 
chapters four and five.
Frank E. Millar also addresses the theme of knowledge 
creation and argues that science is part of a critical 
approach to knowledge. The scientific knowledge claim is 
an expression of organized experience; that is, it is 
repetitive, repeatable, redundant, predictable. Thus the 
quest for creating knowledge— which is always created, not 
discovered— is the quest for organizing experience. The 
elucidation and communication of these patterns is what 
makes knowledge and education possible. Millar contends 
that "the societal function of science is no less than the 
description of social illusions people live by at any point 
in time.... Scientists do not deal with truth; they deal 
with limited and approximate descriptions of reality"
(227) .
W. R. Albury found that not only are scientific 
theories sometimes scrutinized in the academic forum, but 
often in the public forum as well. For example, the 
Sociobiology Study Group (SSG) of Science for the People 
attacked E. 0. Wilson's theories that dealt with a genetic 
basis for racial differences, comparing them to Naziism.
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Though the scientific value or validity of Wilson's genetic 
theories did not enter into any criticisms, the fact that 
his study dealt with racial differences based upon genetics 
was enough to bring the theory into disrepute.
This issue of criticism directed at theories or 
scientists by those outside the field is addressed in 
chapters four and five. Fleischmann and Pons show concern 
about the many negative comments directed at them by the 
press ("Calorimetric" 669); negative editorials about cold 
fusion and Fleischmann and Pons also appeared in Nature, 
often alongside original research articles. Since research 
scientists were just as likely to see articles skeptical of 
cold fusion as they were confirming or non—confirming 
research articles, one wonders how such criticism by the 
journal's non-scientific community influenced those 
scientists.
Philip C. Wander asserts that "the archetypal speaking 
situation for the scientist occurs in addressing an 
audience of fellow scientists, and the archetypal form of 
discourse is the research report" (230). He argues that 
the scientific report must do more than just give 
information; it must persuade as well. For instance, the 
scientist must first convince the editorship of the journal 
that the subject is worthwhile, that the scientist knows 
what he or she is talking about, and that the findings can
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be integrated into current knowledge (230), echoing 
Lakatos.
Such an argument further raises questions about the 
publication process's influence on scientific discourse and 
its distribution. Diana Crane, in her article "The 
Gatekeepers of Science," states that the norms of 
scientific conduct require that a scientist's social 
characteristics be left out of the publication decision. 
However, she points out studies that suggest that the 
evaluation of scientific articles is not entirely 
objective, that a scientific stratification system acts 
differentially to distribute publication opportunities to 
particular scientists, opportunities that play an important 
role in a scientist's success.
For instance, Crane asserts that some studies suggest 
that many published articles are written by scientists at 
major universities, suggesting that selection of articles 
is influenced by academic affiliations. One 1945 study 
showed that articles from authors at minor universities 
were rejected more frequently by The American Sociological 
Review than those by authors at major universities.
Crane found further that the distribution of 
characteristics such as academic affiliation, doctoral 
origin, and professional age of contributors was 
essentially the same distribution as those among the 
journal editors. She suspects that most instances,
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however, are due not to explicit prejudices but to editors 
responding to characteristics in the writing of those with 
similar academic training, methodologies, theoretical 
orientations, and modes of expression (200).
This conclusion confirms the idea that has pervaded 
the discussion on philosophy and sociology thus far: that
communities of scientists share certain values, concerns, 
and assumptions. Discourse, then, which reflects and 
successfully and persuasively addresses these shared 
values, concerns, and assumptions should be more likely to 
meet with success than discourse that ignores and/or fails 
to address such issues. One can imagine, then, a 
rhetorical method of scientific discourse that could 
identify heuristics that scientists could follow to 
increase the likelihood of acceptance of a research 
article, both by colleagues and journal editors. One could 
imagine further that, armed with such a heuristic, a 
rhetorical critic may analyze how well or how poorly a 
scientist has identified relevant issues and addressed them 
in his or her discourse. These imaginings I attempt to 
make substantial in chapter three of this study.
Alfred de Grazia further emphasizes the role of the 
scientific reception system, and thus the importance of 
scientific discourse, in the doing of science. He goes so 
far as to suggest that "when a scientist writes a book of 
his controlled experiences, a publisher ponders its
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audience, and a colleague weighs its value, the special 
order of human relations called science is in being" (45). 
The behaviors of the individuals involved follow common 
human patterns, and so do their motives: one can't
separate the scientist from the person and the person from 
society and its behaviors at large. Likewise in science, 
as in every social order, there exists a reception system. 
The system in science is the same as in any social order: 
it "shapes the character of the new recruits to the order 
and therefore forms the product of the order" (45). He 
suggests, as does Crane, that journal editors are the 
"gatekeepers" of science, screening the information that is 
permitted to circulate widely among members of the 
discipline and tending to support the currently orthodox 
views in their fields. Their receptivity to new ideas is 
variable.
De Grazia characterizes several reception systems, one 
of which he terms the Rationalistic Reception System, based 
on the scientific method. "Its goal is truth, 
enlightenment, knowledge, or just simply 'science'" (46). 
The model itself denies a sociology of science; the idea 
that scientists are conditioned by social factors that lie 
outside their intellect is dismissed in this view: an 
objective method exists for testing reality, and anyone 
confronted with the truth will recognize it immediately.
In this rationalistic doctrine, the rule of the publication
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holds primary importance: every scientist has the right to 
publish and should review results with peers before 
submission.
Several other rules are at work in the Rationalistic 
Reception System. One holds that works must be read before 
judgment is passed. Another holds that theories offered 
should be tested, not only by their authors but by their 
critics. Honesty and fairness are also a credo. "Unless 
scientists are willing to admit the source of their 
knowledge and theories, and willing to grant a fair hearing 
and test to ideas brought forth, they contribute to the 
collapse of the rationalistic reception system" (48). De 
Grazia further observes that "the model of rationality 
demands that the populous be barred from scientific
proceedings..-the implication being that unless a work has
the previous blessings of the scientific establishment, it
has no right to exist" (4 9).
If de Grazia's conclusion is correct, Fleischmann and 
Pons seem ill-fated from the start, having violated several 
rules of the Rationalistic Reception System. Their results 
on cold fusion underwent no sort of peer review before 
being made public; their theories were thus untested by 
critics; Pons and Fleischmann refused to release their 
apparatus for investigation, nor did they release enough 
detail to allow other scientists to replicate their 
experiment; and news of their findings was made at a
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public press conference rather than in a scientific 
journal. Needless to say, their work had not earned, as de 
Grazia states, "the previous blessings of the scientific 
establishment." De Grazia would conclude then that their 
work had "no right to exist." The details of Pons and 
Fleischmann's behavior and the possible implications of 
their violating nearly every rule of the rationalistic 
reception system will be discussed at length in chapters 
four and five.
Rhetoric of Inquiry
"The Rhetoric of Inquiry will change the way we think
about the way we think," concludes Herbert W. Simons after
attending the four—day 1984 University of Iowa symposium on
Rhetoric and the Human Sciences. An emerging discipline,
the rhetoric of inquiry concerns itself with the use of
rhetoric in the communication practices of research
disciplines of all kinds, whether scientific, humanistic,
or mathematical. This discipline is based on the
assumption that all fields of human inquiry have as their
basis argument and persuasion. As Nelson states,
Scholarship uses argument, and argument uses 
rhetoric. The 'rhetoric' is not mere ornament or 
manipulation or trickery. It is rhetoric in the 
ancient sense of persuasive discourse. In 
matters from mathematical proof to literary 
criticism, scholars write rhetorically. Only 
occasionally do they reflect on that fact.
(Rhetoric 3)
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Further, a central concept is that rarely, if ever, do 
facts speak for themselves: "facts themselves are mute,
[scientists] do the speaking—  whether through them or for 
them" (Nelson, Rhetoric 8). If scientific discourse is at 
the root persuasive, argumentative communication, a clearer 
understanding of the functions of rhetoric in scientific 
fields will "make the sciences more intelligible to 
themselves and others" (Nelson, Rhetoric 5). In their 
article "The Rhetoric of Inquiry: Projects and Prospects," 
Nelson and Megill engage in what they term "an exercise in 
communication across fields, an attempt to explain and 
advance a line of investigation they call rhetoric of 
inquiry" ("Projects" 20). They relate briefly the story of 
the thinkers prior to the seventeenth century who regarded 
rhetoric as the prime domain of language and argument.
Since then, rhetoric has played a small role in Western 
thought. They observe that rhetoric has become "at best a 
technology useful to politicians or others who wish to win 
friends or influence people, but trivial in its own right" 
("Projects" 20).
The rhetoric of inquiry urges scholars to overcome any 
insistence on certainties either needed or achieved.
Nelson and Megill suggest that in scholarship, as with all 
human activities, accepting uncertainties can often produce 
a greater appreciation of questions and complexities. In 
inquiry, such a stance allows an understanding of the
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diverse standards and strategies of the sciences on their 
own levels. The rhetoric of inquiry insists on connecting 
the process of science not only to its logic and method, 
but additionally to its aesthetics, economics, histories, 
and sociologies. Insisting that even academic reasoning is 
practical reasoning, it situates research in uncertain but 
actual communities of human experience. "It reminds 
scholars that rhetoric was the first, and in some respects, 
remains the foremost science of the human communities" 
("Projects" 25).
The rhetoric of inquiry has the power to dispel 
dichotomies among the humanities and social sciences by 
comparing different arenas and strategies of inquiry, thus 
helping independent projects learn from the results and 
principles of others (35). It may encourage scholars to 
radically rethink their disciplines by revealing the ways 
in which the sciences rely not less upon but differently 
upon rhetoric than do the humanities. It should not be a 
distinct field, although specialization is inevitable. It 
must grow and gain strength from and be informed by the 
interaction of disciplinary research and inquiry, 
interaction that is necessary to ensure the quality of its 
analysis and the authority of its advice ("Projects" 35). 
Its goal is to explain how scholars legitimately invoke 
different reasons persuasively in different contexts (35).
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John Lyne describes the 1984 Iowa Symposium on 
Rhetoric and the Human Sciences in his article "Rhetorics 
of Inquiry." Lyne reports that while no single definition 
of rhetoric was evident at the symposium, four identifiable 
lines of thought emerged from the symposium by which one 
may characterize the function of rhetoric in relation to 
academic inquiry.
1) Rhetoric as Argument: Rhetoric may be considered
the argumentative practice particular to each academic 
paradigm, the stuff of which argument is made and which is 
then taken as a source of knowledge within the several 
human sciences (66). One area of research is whether the 
sources of disagreement in the human sciences differ in 
kind from those issues found in the hard sciences. Lyne 
asserts that the persistence of disagreement among equally 
competent experts confounds the model of inquiry as simple 
mastery of the craft (67).
2) Rhetoric as Configuration: The literary studies' 
approach to rhetoric is reemerging, sharing with the 
communication field "the common ground of narrativity, 
metaphor, and figuration" and owing to contemporary 
theories of meaning that have undermined the 
literal/figurative and fact/fiction dichotomies (69). If 
one grants a world socially constructed, "constituted of 
arbitrary signs in ideological formations read like a 
text...there is little to distinguish between literature
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and the discourses of 'the real world'" (69). The manner 
in which academia builds its knowledge claims through 
figurative language is a growing area of study.
3) Rhetoric as Critical Practice: The oft—voiced 
concern for what happens to objectivity if one concedes a 
persuasive role to rhetoric in the structure of inquiry is 
just one part of the broader concern about error and 
accountability. No one should deny the possibility of 
being somehow subject to correction. Any speech act should 
be accountable to the world in which it is produced. 
Criticism is one method to maintain that accountability, 
and it is a function of rhetoric. Correction and 
accountability need not presuppose fixed standards; an 
ongoing, evolving dialogue among research paradigms will 
demand both (69).
4) Rhetoric as a Means of Empowerment: Scholar 
Gerald Bruns has observed that rhetoric originated as a 
means of enabling people to gain power over situations 
(70). Perhaps the greatest benefit of studying the 
rhetoric of inquiry will be its ability to explain somewhat 
the relationship between power and knowledge. We might 
gain a better understanding of how power relations are 
enhanced, changed, or diluted by the rhetorical development 
of "knowledge" (70).
Lyne suggests the study of any of the above areas of 
rhetoric might contribute to an overarching purpose of
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making academic discourses better serve public needs, 
"enriching rather than denuding the grounds of public 
understanding and decision" (70).
How might one recover wisdom in a modern, 
technological age in which the various research specialties 
shield themselves from public judgements through use of 
self—isolating vocabularies and territorial claims of 
expertise? If rhetoricians can begin to get a sense of the 
rhetorical practices of the these specialties, it may be 
possible to "make the discourses of academic knowledge 
better mesh with public life" (70-71) .
Simons also offers his commentary on the symposium, 
writing that it "may well be remembered as a watershed 
event in the history of rhetoric" ("Chronicle" 52). 
Panelists included McCloskey, an economist; Megill, a 
historian; Nelson, a political scientist; Thomas S. Kuhn; a 
science historian and philosopher; and Richard Rorty, a 
philosopher. Those attending experienced a shared 
excitement and agreed they were attending an event whose 
time had come.
The symposium challenged several objectivist notions: 
the correspondence theory of truth; the mind as a "glassy 
essence"; scientific language as a mirror of reality; and 
verification as well as falsification as demarcation 
criteria for a "true" science. Some panelists, such as 
Richard Rorty, questioned the notion of epistemology itself
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("Chronicle" 53). The challenges cut across many
disciplines: history, women's studies, literary criticism,
theology, and law. These challenges to long-held and
prevailing notions have resulted in intensified critical
attention to the language and logic of the human sciences
that lead inevitably to their use of rhetoric ("Chronicle"
53). Geertz referred to a "refiguration of social thought"
("Chronicle" 53), both here and abroad, catalyzed by a
shift from technology imageries to metaphors and analogies
taken from the humanities. In the "new metalanguage" of
the human sciences,
behaviors, cultures, entire historical epochs might be 
viewed as texts, scientific data as symbolic 
constructions, scientific theories and descriptions as 
narratives, mathematical proofs as rhetorical tropes, 
and the ongoing activities of scientific communities 
as conversations. ("Chronicle" 53)
Richard Rorty is the philosophic spokesperson for the 
rhetoric of inquiry. In his piece "Science as Solidarity," 
he accurately describes our culture as one that considers 
synonymous the concepts of science, rationality, 
objectivity, and truth. As such, science becomes a 
religion of sorts: the scientist replaces the priest as the 
one who promises to deliver abstract, ultimate truth. As a 
result, any discipline that wants to be taken seriously 
must imitate science. Disciplines with names like "human 
science" or "behavioral science" or "political science" 
arise and seek ways to incorporate the rationality and 
objectivity of scientific methods into their own.
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If science is to be emulated, however, it should not
be because scientists are "more 'objective' or 'logical' or
'methodical' or 'devoted to the truth' than other people'"
(45). Rather, it is because science is a "model of human
solidarity" (46). The "goal of inquiry...[is] the
attainment of an appropriate mixture of unforced agreement
with tolerant disagreement" (48). It is the atmosphere
that promotes free and open debate that fuels human
inquiry. A more productive pursuit to advance human
knowledge is possible through a new mind-set achieved
through a shift in vocabulary that reveals that scientists
should be emulated because of the way they utilize free and
open criticism.
For instance, a popular notion of scientific
rationality naming beforehand the criteria by which a
hypothesis will be declared disconfirmed (recall Popper's
philosophy of science) and be prepared to discard the
hypothesis under such conditions. However, problems arise
from this thinking. For instance,
It is characteristic of democratic and 
pluralistic societies to continually redefine 
their goals. But if to be rational means to 
satisfy criteria, then this process of 
redefinition is bound to be nonrational. So if 
[this process] is to be viewed as
rational... rationality will have to be thought of 
as something other than the satisfaction of 
criteria which are statable in advance. (40)
However, if we then define rational in its other sense, as
"sane" or "reasonable," rather than "methodical," the term
represents a set of moral principles: "tolerance, respect 
for the opinions of those around one, willingness to 
listen, reliance on persuasion rather than force" (40).
When thought of as such, a dichotomy between the rational 
and irrational has little relevance toward distinctions 
between hard and soft sciences. It has more to do with a 
method that "eschews dogmatism, defensiveness, and 
righteous indignation" (40). It has to do with blurring 
the distinctions between objective and subjective and fact 
and value that the criterial definition of rationality 
promotes. "Truth," suggests Rorty, is what will win out in 
an atmosphere of free and open debate, an atmosphere that 
promotes the moral principles referred to above. For 
"objective," we should substitute "unforced agreement," for 
included in such a substitute is the guarantee given for 
any "objective" observation, namely, intersubjective 
verification. Thus, Rorty concludes that "the best way to 
find out what to believe is to listen to as many 
suggestions and arguments as you can" (4 6).
Epistemoloqical Questions
Suggesting that the practice of science is, at least 
in part, rhetorical eventually raises epistemological 
concerns: What, then, is the status of existing knowledge
claims? How can we then ever hope to discover truth or 
what is real? How do essentially subjective,
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individualistic arguments interface with the objective 
universe?
Such questions retain as their basis the traditional 
dichotomy between rhetoric and science, especially evident 
in questions such as the latter. What is becoming clearer 
is that through rhetoric scientists are able to reach a 
consensus about what is reasonably true about the workings 
of nature.
At the outset, questions about epistemology and 
ontology may be addressed most easily by arguing that such 
concerns are actually a red herring: the manner in which
scientists convince as opposed to of what they convince are 
different issues. My examination in chapter four of the 
rhetoric involved in the cold fusion controversy is not 
intended to answer the question, "Is cold fusion a 
reality?" or "Is what Pons and Fleishman observed actually 
cold nuclear fusion?" Rather, the goal of my study is to 
explain the use of rhetoric in scientific communication and 
the "doing of science." Whether scientists make direct 
observations of reality, whether they have access to 
directly observable phenomena through undistorted views, 
and whether the truths we hold as truths are true are 
issues apart from what strategies scientists use to present 
evidence and convince others of its scientific 
reasonableness.
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However, wish as we might, such deep rooted and 
historically popular issues are not so easily laid to rest. 
Some argue that accepting the premise that science has a 
rhetorical element presupposes a certain epistemological 
bent. For instance, the logical positivists such as those 
of the Vienna Circle, foundationalists who grounded 
knowledge claims in observable, empirical hard facts, would 
accept no such notion. Other more "soft" or "fuzzy" 
thinkers like Richard Rorty, who would substitute the term 
"unforced agreement" for objectivity, readily endorse the 
concept of a rhetorical face of science. James A. Berlin 
earlier identified two twentieth century rhetorics with 
dichotomous positions on the role of language in reality.
To further complicate the matter, some programs of 
rhetorical inquiry make epistemological claims. Nelson and 
Megill argue that the program espoused by the rhetoric of 
inquiry is "a conceptually adequate and pragmatically 
useful replacement for foundationalism and objectivism" 
(Hikins and Zagacki 201). Simons remarks that the rhetoric 
of inquiry "will change the way we think about the way we 
think." And Bazerman's analysis of the epistemological 
trends in spectroscopic articles demonstrates how 
epistemological stance influences an article's rhetoric. 
Hikins and Zagacki offer the finest theory I have 
encountered to reconcile the scientists' search for truth 
while allowing for their use of rhetoric. Hikins and
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Zagacki offer their theory as an attenuation of the 
rhetoric of inquiry's program. They object to the rhetoric 
of inquiry's subjectivist emphasis, claiming its program is 
"grounded on erroneous and inconsistent assumptions" and 
objecting that such interpretations "prevent an adequate 
account of past progress in the sciences, philosophy, and 
the arts" (201). Hikins and Zagacki argue that the 
rhetoric of inquiry "abandons the distinction between 
epistemology and ontology, resulting in untenable 
consequences" (212).
They further criticize the rhetoric of inquiry on 
several levels. First, they argue generally against the 
notion of the "value—laden hypothesis," prevalent in 
sociological views of science and philosophies similar to 
Kuhn's. Such views argue that scientists have values, 
goals, and preconceptions that necessarily affect their 
hypotheses and observations of experimental data and 
outcomes. Kuhn, for instance, argues that there is no 
theory—independent way of testing reality. This view, 
argue Hikins and Zagacki, is a non sequitur. They concede 
that scientists, like all other people, have values, goals, 
and so on, but this concession "in no way entails that 
observation is systematically or necessarily distorted, or 
otherwise rendered opaque to understanding. Indeed, this 
conclusion is merely assumed to follow by most who rely on 
the argument" (209).
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Second, Hikins and Zagacki attack a notion central to
the rhetoric of inquiry's program and exemplified by
Rorty's concept of "unforced agreement": intersubjective
truth, "that audiences decide upon their own standards of
discovery and decision-making, and what counts as 'true'
for such audiences is whatever they agree upon by
consensus....With the dissolution of objectivist ontology
comes the kindred dissolution of any external standards by
which to evaluate...the beliefs of rhetorical communities
as 'false'" (212-213). Therefore, they argue, the Flat
Earth Society's beliefs about a truly flat earth or the
community of children's beliefs in Santa Claus are as valid
as any other belief. Hikins and Zagacki rebut the argument
for intersubjective truth thusly: no matter how many or how
strongly children believe in Santa Claus, he will not
really exist (213).
Thirdly, Hikins and Zagacki realize that the result of
the program's replacing symbolism for realism and
representationalism leaves it open to the same criticism it
levels against realism and representationalism, because the
symbols it substitutes actually represent real—world
concepts such as "rhetors, audiences, messages, objects of
discourse, and goals of edification" (217).
They conclude that
So thoroughgoing is the skepticism resulting once 
this realization obtains, that [this view] 
devolves into a solipsistic conundrum....If we 
hold the skeptic to his/her assumptions, no
80
audience can ever possibly comprehend the intent 
of the expositor's discourse, and no expositor 
can ever hope to gauge successfully the 
audience's reasons for interpreting his/her 
message as it does. Communication appears 
hopeless. Obviously, skeptics must be making 
some tacit, if not a priori, assumptions about 
the rhetorical nature of rhetorical 
situations.... There is, in short, no consistent 
way for such a position to give an account of 
language and communication which does not simply 
undermine its own rejection of objectivity.
(218)
Hikins and Zagacki "suggest that the only way to 
preserve as meaningful and useful such seminal 
communication concepts as audience, speaker, message, and 
rhetorical environment is to renounce representationalism 
in all its forms," including the above discussed symbolism, 
the idea that communication operates through symbols that 
distort or even create reality (218). To do so, one must 
reject the assumption "that the objects of reality— things- 
in-themselves— are necessarily opaque to human 
understanding" (218). What they offer as an attenuation to 
the rhetoric of inquiry's program they term "rhetorical 
perspectivism."
According to this view, conflicting or various 
depictions of reality are not so much the product of 
subjective distortions as they are the products of the 
viewer's perspective on a particular aspect of reality.
For instance, one observer of a high hill may report that 
the hillside is covered with deciduous trees while another 
may report the hillside is covered with pine trees. Though
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at first these reports may appear contradictory or even 
mutually exclusive, they are both accurate when one 
considers perspective: the two observers are looking at
different sides of the same high hill (219). No logical 
problems are involved; no epistemic problem exists; and the 
disparate reports are reconciled through a process of 
communication: once both campers explain their positions—
that is, allow one another to "stand inside the other's 
perspective"— both are enlightened (220). Thus, though the 
view is a realist view, the role of rhetoric remains 
central, for in mediating perspectives, "language does not 
stand as a distorting intermediary between rhetor/knower 
and the object of discourse/knowledge. Instead, language 
serves as an interface, making possible a linkage between 
consciousness and the furnishings of the external world" 
(222). Hikins and Zagacki can thus salvage realism and 
objectivism and maintain the centrality of rhetoric in the 
doing of science. Their rhetorical perspectivism meets the 
"scientific standards" of elegance and parsimony and seems 
a valuable and reasonable mediation of realism and 
rhetoric, demonstrating that a rhetoric of science can play 
a central role even in realist world-views.
This review of the literature has suggested most 
importantly the inter-relationships among the rhetoric of 
science and the philosophy and sociology of science, the
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rhetoric of inquiry, and epistemology. Scientific rhetors 
draw upon and are influenced by all these disciplines, for 
evident is the importance of identifying relevant 
scientific issues and concerns and addressing these 
satisfactorily for the audience. Additionally, many 
specific issues and concerns from these disciplines were 
identified as factors in the cold fusion controversy, 
especially from the philosophy and sociology of science.
For example, the philosophy of science suggests the 
importance of Fleischmann and Pons's demonstrating the 
relevance of their claims to current lines of thinking and 
inquiry; Fleischmann and Pons violated many sociological 
norms of scientific behavior. Chapter three will develop a 
working method whereby the rhetorical critic can identify 
these relevant issues and concerns that confront scientific 
rhetors in their attempts to deal successfully with these 
elements in their discourse.
Chapter Three: Methods of Rhetorical Analysis
Chapter two asserts the central importance of 
communication between scientists in their practice of 
science. An examination of scholarship from the 
philosophy, rhetoric, and sociology of science reveals the 
importance of scientists first identifying relevant issues 
from their particular communities and research programs and 
then addressing these issues satisfactorily. Successful 
scientific writers may demonstrate how their work fits into 
and advances the current program of research; they may 
solicit support for their particular disciplinary matrix; 
they may attempt to describe a new phenomenon and lay claim 
to a particular research avenue; or they may argue strongly
that one theoretical orientation is more fruitful than some
other.
The obvious task, then, in order to judge the degree 
of the scientific writer's success, must also be to 
identify the relevant concerns of the scientific community 
and various research programs. S. Michael Halloran has 
more clearly identified this task: "the job of the
rhetorical critic is to discover what in the particular
case were the available means of persuasion, and judge 
whether the rhetor managed them well or badly" (70).
In this chapter, I will develop a working theory of 
rhetorical analysis by examining a method developed by
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Lawrence Prelli in his book, A Rhetoric of Science: 
Inventing Scientific Discourse, and by reviewing Halloran's 
rhetorical analysis of DNA discourse. Using Prelli's 
method to identify relevant issues and lines of argument 
and Halloran's method of what I term "close reading" to 
judge how well these issues and arguments are addressed, I 
will apply in chapter four this working theory of 
rhetorical analysis to the cold fusion controversy.
Because Prelli's is the more formalized of the two methods, 
I first discuss his in some detail and then turn to 
Halloran's method through an examination of his analysis of 
DNA discourse.
Prelli's Special Theory of Rhetorical Invention
Lawrence Prelli asserts that when scientists 
communicate with one another, "they make a special kind of 
rhetoric" (1). There is more to science than the logical 
dimension; he discusses McMullin who argues that the 
logicality of science is but one aspect of science. The 
logical positivists of the Vienna Circle erred when they 
insisted that science proceeds only on the basis of 
formally logical criteria. Such an insistence elicited 
criticism from many sources. As discussed in chapter two, 
for instance, Popper successfully undermined the notions of 
induction and verifiability. Kuhn argued that formally 
logical procedures occurred only during what he termed
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periods of "normal science." Prelli also makes the point 
emphasized in chapter two that all the aforementioned 
theories of the philosophy, sociology, and history of 
science and the rhetorical programs of inquiry, when "taken 
collectively, make clear that science has an other-than- 
formally-logical 'face'," which McMullin has termed the 
"interpretive face" (Prelli 3).
In sum, this interpretive face is intuitive, 
irreducible to explicit criteria, context dependent, 
reliant on individual talents, and often controversial 
(Prelli 3). It follows that if science has an 
interpretative face, the activity of doing science is 
necessarily rhetorical, involving "arguments that are 
informal, material, contextual, and controversial" (Prelli 
5) .
Prelli goes on to argue that to study scientific 
communication, one must establish a valid and reliable 
theory of scientific rhetoric. A rhetoric of science is 
not actually the science, but must indicate the logic that 
the science exhibits. It also is not a philosophy, 
history, sociology, or psychology of science, but again 
must agree with the tenets of such. A rhetoric of science 
should explain comprehensively the communicative practices 
of a science: the discursive decisions scientists make
when attempting to "render their claims reasonable in the 
eyes of scientific audiences" (Prelli 8), and the way
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scientists decide between competing theories. Such
scientific decisions are based on "good reason,1 that is,
the "choices will be made with due respect for the values
and knowledge problems shared by that [scientific]
community" (Prelli 113). Claims can be considered
reasonable depending on how well they are judged to
"possess qualities of empirical accuracy, consistency,
quantitative precision, or explanatory power." Claims
which lack these qualities "can be dubbed scientifically
unreasonable" (Prelli 115).
Scientists, however, while sharing a variety of
values, can still debate reasonably about the relative
importance and applicability of these values in a given
situation. In such cases, the "logicality of persuasive
success depends on whether those claims can be judged
situationally reasonable" (Prelli 114). This view of
scientific rhetoric agrees with traditional definitions of
rhetoric and their concern with persuasion in the given
situation. Further, such a view
avoids the strains and struggles of accounting 
for scientific activity as fundamentally either 
rational or irrational, objective or subjective.
It is also consistent with what actually happens 
in scientific exchanges. Audiences of scientists 
judge scientific claims, not with reference to 
the canons of formal logic, but against received 
community problems, values, expectations, and 
interests. The judgmental standards are located 
within situated audiences' frames of reference, 
not in logical rules that transcend specific 
situations for scientific claiming. (Prelli 7)
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The goal, then, of a rhetoric of science should be to 
reveal "the principles according to which scientific 
discourse is created and judged" in order to "reveal 
significant aspects of scientific endeavors that might 
otherwise be concealed" (8) .
Prelli has developed such a rhetoric of science. His 
definition is adapted from Aristotle, "the faculty of 
observing in any given case the available means of 
persuasion" (35), and Burke's idea of symbolic language, 
that rhetoric is "the suasory use of language as a symbolic 
means of inducing cooperative acts and attitudes in 
symbolizing [human] beings " (13—14).
Prelli has identified the methods by which scientists 
use rhetorical invention as a means of constructing 
successful scientific rhetoric. As established earlier, 
these methods are also useful for the analysis of 
scientific rhetoric. Prelli has developed a matrix of 
stasis procedures and distinguished several scientific 
rhetorical topoi appropriate to scientific discourse. Both 
of these aspects of rhetorical invention promise to be 
useful tools for a case study of cold fusion.
Rhetorical Stases
Prelli's matrix of the rhetorical stases— or issues—  
of scientific discourse identify particular points of 
contention in discourse. Prelli observes that "points at
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issue in science always concern one or more of problems 
about existence, meaning, value, and. action" (147). These 
four points of contention he terms superior stases, and 
they
identify arguable points about the four grand 
functions of doing science: adducing evidence,
interpreting constructs and information, 
evaluating the scientific significance of matters 
discussed, and applying scientific methods.
Discussants must agree on such matters or 
scientific activity cannot expand comprehension 
of natural order. (Prelli 145)
Included under each of these superior stases are
subordinate issues that must be reconciled; Prelli labels
them subordinate stases. The sixteen stases and their
concerns are shown below in figure 1.
For a scientific rhetor's discourse to seem
scientifically reasonable, he or she must address one or
more of the issues involved in the superior stases; the
audience may already be concerned with the issues, or the
rhetor may raise them. Sometimes a single piece of
discourse may address all four superior stases. For
instance, scientists may question whether enough evidence
exists to present a definite judgment on some new
phenomenon. Some may argue that the evidence is an
instrumental artifact or is inconclusive (evidential).
Others may contend that the models used for explaining the
phenomenon are more important than the certainty of the
evidence (interpretative). Yet others may argue that the
evidence is insufficiently scientifically valuable to
89
pursue (evaluative); and someone else may contend that no 
more evidence is needed but a new method of collecting 
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Figure 1. Rhetorical Stasis Procedures of Scientific 
Discourse (Prelli 146)
Also, a paper may address all four subordinate stases 
within a superior framework. For instance, in a paper 
announcing a discovery, the scientist might address the 
evidential stasis to establish that the new phenomenon does 
indeed exist. Discourse addressed at establishing the
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reliability of the evidence or that the evidence is not an 
instrumental artifact would involve the evidential/ 
conjectural stasis; addressing questions about the meaning 
of the evidence or fitting it into existing taxonomies 
involves the evidential/definitional stasis. Demonstrating 
that the evidence proves a conclusion instead of merely 
suggesting probability addresses the evidential/conjectural 
stasis, while determining which claims about reality seem 
the most likely based on the evidence addresses the 
evidential/definitional.
On the other hand, in dealing with a new phenomenon, 
writers might place their discourse within the 
interpretative framework, determining which scientific 
models are most useful for illuminating the evidence. 
Therefore, put into the situation of writing about new 
phenomenon, the writer is faced with a choice: does enough
evidence exist to render a definite judgment that will seem 
scientifically reasonable? Or should one simply suggest a 
construct for interpreting the new evidence? Whatever the 
situation, however, the important characteristic of all the 
above situations, for both the scientific writer and the 
rhetorical critic, is the abundance of choice.
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, 
Prelli offers his stasis procedures primarily as a method 
for creating scientific discourse but also recognizes its 
value as a means of analysis. By making scientists and
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rhetorical critics more formally aware of this already 
informally recognized procedure, perhaps then, as Nelson 
and Megill suggest, the "sciences would become more 
comprehensible to themselves and others" (Rhetoric 7).
Rhetorical Topoi
In addition to his matrix of stasis procedures, Prelli 
has also identified several rhetorical topoi, or lines of 
argument, which one would reasonably anticipate a 
scientific audience to raise in a given situation. Prelli 
contends
(1) that there are in fact identifiable lines of 
thought that are used again and again in the 
sciences; (2) that these lines of thought 
legitimize scientific observations and claims 
because they derive from what is accepted and 
valued in scientific communities; and (3) that if 
we want to see what the logical formulas and 
characteristics of scientific discourse are, we 
must grant that these topoi identify structures 
of thought that scientists (and often others) 
find situationally reasonable. These themes 
constitute a stable, ever-present collection of 
discussable options....Knowing what these options 
are is helpful to any scientist deciding what to 
say and how to say it to his or her colleagues.
Knowing them is also useful in critique of 
scientific rhetoric because the array of standard 
topoi will remind observers of what could have 
been said about a scientific subject. With 
knowledge of these options a creator or critic of 
scientific rhetoric is able to estimate the 
relative usefulness or nonusefulness of themes in 
specific rhetorical situations. Knowledge of 
legitimated themes is also knowledge of what 
topoi will not count as reasonable, scientific 
thought; for example, the toposof "inspiration" 
is not in the array of topoi authorized by 
scientific communities. (Prelli 216-217)
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A method of rhetorical topoi, then, would yield a heuristic 
which one could follow to generate ideas about topics that 
may be raised by a particular audience and that would help 
persuade that audience. Such a method would generate 
categories, questions, or relationships between ideas 
perhaps not readily evident to the rhetor otherwise.
Topoi differ from stases in that stases are issues of 
dispute and questions of relevance, whiletopoi are lines of 
argument which one may use to address the issues. For 
example, the stasis. or issue, may be whether or not an 
experimental result was actually observed; the rhetor may 
include the topos of significant anomaly to help convince 
others of the importance of the finding. In practice, a 
rhetor (or rhetorical analyst) could identify the issues in 
discourse, and then consider which of the several lines of 
argument could be used to address the issue.
Considering the goal of science— to explain, predict, 
and control natural phenomena— Prelli has identified for 
scientific discourse four typical categories of topoi and 
the line of argument relevant to each that scientists may 
include to enhance the persuasiveness of their discourse: 
problem-solution topoi. lines of argument that address 
whether research should or should not be accepted because 
it will or will not further the problem solving concerns of 
the scientific community; evaluative topoi. in which the 
values of accuracy, simplicity, scope, and consistency are
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argued; exemplary topoi, which deal with analogies, 
metaphors, and examples, and topoi of ethos, which address 
possible conflicts between the rhetor's interests and the 
normative goals of science (125-126).
Figure two shows Prelli's four categories of topoi and 
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Figure 2. Prelli's Categories of Rhetorical Topoi
Among the problem-solution topoi, the most relevant to 
the analysis of cold fusion include the topos of
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experimental competence, which addresses the competence of 
the experimenters as well as whether the observation 
resulted from a scientifically conducted experiment; 
experimental replication, which concerns whether the 
results can be duplicated; and external consistency, which 
asks if the observation or theory corresponds with accepted 
knowledge. The relevant evaluative topos is external 
consistency, the argument that findings should fit with 
accepted knowledge. Also important to the cold fusion 
controversy are the topoi that deal with the scientist's 
ethos. Communality maintains the importance of 
intellectual participation with one's scientific community 
and also forbids association with the lay community; 
disinterestedness requires that the scientist emotionally 
distance him or herself from the results, findings, or 
observations; and universality concerns whether the 
scientist conducted him or herself according to widely 
accepted scientific standards.
Prelli's Analysis of Watson and Crick
Prelli applies his special theory of rhetorical 
invention/analysis to several episodes of communication, 
including Watson and Crick's article, "A Structure for 
Deoxyribose Nucleic Acid" in which they communicate their 
discovery of the DNA double helix. Since both Prelli and 
Halloran analyze this article, the opportunity exists to
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examine the application of their methods and evaluate their 
usefulness as analytical tools concerning scientific 
rhetoric.
Prelli contends that the success of the Watson-Crick 
article resulted from "the wisdom with which the authors 
chose their points to address and the persuasiveness and 
logical relevance of the topoi from which they drew 
argument" (249). They did what scientists must do when 
attempting to persuade their peers: chose a rhetorical
purpose aimed at addressing a particular issue, in this 
case the interpretive issue, and engaged, in order, the 
relevant subordinate stases—  conjectural, definitional, 
and qualitative— that otherwise could have prevented the 
audience's acceptance of the paper's claims.
Watson and Crick framed the issue concerning the 
structure of the DNA molecule as an interpretive stasis, 
one involving "ambiguities in the meanings of theoretical 
constructs used to account for data" (Prelli 151). The 
community of molecular biologists had at their disposal 
much empirical data and accepted theory concerning 
molecular behavior, but had "difficulty deciding what 
theoretical constructs or models accommodate" the data and 
theory (Prelli 151).
Having framed the rhetorical situation in the 
interpretative stasis, Watson and Crick then proceed,
Prelli discovers, to address the subordinate stases of
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conjectural, definitional, and qualitative, in that order. 
Watson and Crick first demonstrate that no scientifically 
meaningful construct existed to interpret the available 
evidence, thereby addressing the conjectural stasis of the 
interpretive framework- They next offer their own model, 
addressing the interpretive/definitional issue by 
"answering the central question: What is the model for the
molecular structure of DNA?" (Prelli 24 0). Finally, Watson 
and Crick address the interpretative/gualitative issue by 
answering the question, Which interpretive applications of 
the double-helix model are more meaningful? In addressing 
this final issue, they demonstrated their model's 
reasonableness by evoking the topoi of empirical adequacy 
and explanatory power (Prelli 243).
Prelli concludes his analysis by making the following 
observations about scientific rhetoric: 1) scientists,
like other rhetors, choose from "among alternative ways" of 
expressing themselves; 2) their choices are influenced by 
ideals of reasonableness on the part of their specific 
scientific audience; 3) "a finite set of themes, values, 
and criteria constrains what will be necessary and 
appropriate to say"; 4) such constraints "are neither 
irrational nor formally logical" but nonetheless provide 
standards by which scientific discourse is judged; and 5) 
these constraints are modifications of "principles of
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general rhetorical theory concerning ends, points at issue, 
and topoi" (256-257).
Halloran's Method of Close Reading
S . Michael Halloran also examines the rhetoric of the 
Watson—Crick paper in "The Birth of Molecular Biology: An
Essay in the Rhetorical Criticism of Scientific Discourse." 
Though his method of analysis is less formalized than 
Prelli's, he identifies the topos of elegance and addresses 
the ethos of Watson and Crick, as might one using Prelli's 
method. However, his method of what I term "close reading" 
focuses mainly on word choice and tone and the way these 
features create the ethos which Halloran claims is central 
to the rhetorical success of the Watson/Crick article.
Halloran contends that Watson and Crick establish for 
themselves a particular ethos; they "offered a model of the 
scientist, of how he ought to hold ideas and present them 
to his peers" (78), that is, "confident, personal, [and] 
rhetorically adept" (77). The success of their paper, 
claims Halloran, is a result of this ethos that they 
establish for themselves. Halloran relies upon knowledge 
of the rhetorical situation and begins his criticism with a 
brief summary of the competition between Pauling, Wilkins, 
Franklin, and Watson and Crick surrounding DNA research, 
indicating that no one anticipated the implications of 
knowing the DNA structure. Halloran argues that the
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Watson—Crick ethos is a result of this competitiveness and 
the significance of the structural model in "the 
possibility of mastering and ultimately manipulating the 
process" of genetic replication (71).
Early in his analysis, Halloran identifies Watson and 
Crick's use of topoi, specifically that of scientific 
elegance (as Watson observed, "a structure this pretty [the 
DNA double-helix] just had to exist") and explanatory 
power. (These observations are similar to those which 
Prelli might make and endorse.) Both topoi are represented 
implicitly, however, with no explicit, lengthy discussion 
or explanation.
According to Halloran, these topoi constitute the 
first two of three substantial arguments which Watson and 
Crick advance. The third argument is a negative one: "the
proposed model is not inconsistent with any available 
experimental data" (Halloran 74). Though this argument is 
advanced explicitly, unlike the first two, Halloran 
emphasizes "how carefully qualified the statement is" (74). 
He suggests that the paper is thus argumentatively 
understated, "and the rhetorical effect is to communicate a 
sense of supreme confidence" (74). The paper's initial 
claims to "considerable biological interest" are advanced 
by "arguments [that is, topoi1...assumed to be so 
persuasive that they need no bolstering or emphasis" (74). 
Watson and Crick are able to project, then, an ethos of
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supreme confidence. Thus, Halloran identifies Watson and 
Crick's use of the topoi of elegance and explanatory power, 
as one might by using Prelli's method, but Halloran's 
"close reading" moves him beyond identifying the relevant 
line of argument to revealing how the argument was 
implemented effectively.
Halloran next looks closely at the "genteel tone" of 
the Watson-Crick paper, citing from the introduction, "We 
wish to suggest a structure for the salt of...DNA....This 
structure has novel features which are of considerable 
biological interest" (Halloran 74) . He identifies the 
"delicate fashion" in which Watson and Crick dismiss a 
rival model suggested by Pauling and Corey: "In our
opinion, this structure is unsatisfactory for two reasons:
(1) We believe that the material which gives the x—ray 
diagrams is the salt, not the free acid. Without the 
acidic hydrogen atoms it is not clear what forces would 
hold the structure together....(2) Some of the van der 
Waals distances appear to be too small" (Halloran 74). 
Halloran uses knowledge of the rhetorical situation in 
explaining the tone of the Pauling-Corey rejection, 
recalling Watson's account of how he and Crick "were 
astonished and jubilant to find the great Pauling guilty of 
what they regarded as a gross error" (Halloran 74). If 
this account is accurate, Halloran asserts, then the paper
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"reflects a rhetorical persona" written "with a bit of 
intentional, tongue-in-cheek irony" (74).
Halloran attends to the one—sentence conclusion of the 
Watson-Crick paper, "It has not escaped our notice that the 
specific pairing we have postulated immediately suggests a 
possible copying mechanism for the genetic material." He 
remarks that, "One can almost feel the elbow in one's 
ribs," and that Watson and Crick's "genteel style becomes a 
transparent burlesque" (74). Again, Halloran asserts that 
this tone creates the persona, or ethos, of Watson and 
Crick that is central to the paper's success.
A Working Model of Rhetorical Analysis
Clearly, the strength of Prelli's theory of rhetorical 
invention and analysis lies in identifying for a given 
situation the relevant stases and topoi that a scientist 
must address to render his or her discourse scientifically 
reasonable in the eyes of the audience. The strength of 
Halloran's model of close textual reading lies in revealing 
the subtleties of language and argument, identifying such 
textual features as tone, understatement, and word choice, 
which Prelli's method is unable to accommodate. Combining 
the strengths of both Prelli's special theory and 
Halloran's model, one can conceive of a powerful tool for 
rhetorical analysis. The two-fold task of the rhetorical 
critic in Halloran's definition, "to discover what in the
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particular case were the available means of persuasion, and 
judge whether the rhetor managed them well or badly" (70) 
would seem well—served by this combination.
Of further importance is the fact that Prelli did not 
in the course of his analysis reveal Watson and Crick's 
evocation of the topoi of elegance and explanatory power, 
their use being critical to Halloran's analysis. A 
possible interpretation of Halloran's identifying those 
lines of argument while Prelli did not is that Halloran's 
reliance on language and the understatement of argument led 
him to notice the existence, and importance, of those 
topoi. Prelli's analysis focused more on the structure of 
the article, the important concern for him being the 
identification of superior and subordinate stases. It may 
be that combining the methods would yield more than the sum 
of their parts, the two methods complementarily revealing 
features, then, which the other may not detect.
Considering the above, the procedure used in the next 
chapter applies Prelli's method, identify all possible, 
relevant issues and lines of argument that the writers 
could have drawn upon; next, identifies the issues and 
arguments employed; and then, following Halloran's model, 
determines the manner in which these are addressed and the 
degree of success in terms of rendering the discussion 
scientifically reasonable to the audience.
Chapter Four: The Rhetoric of Cold Fusion
Prelli's model of rhetorical invention, with its 
theories of stases(issues) and topoi (lines of argument), 
combined with Halloran's method of close reading offer a 
powerful method for rhetorical analysis. Having described 
this method, I will now apply it to analyze particular 
pieces of discourse in the cold fusion controversy. My 
objective will be to discover how the cold fusion 
controversy may be considered rhetorical in nature and how 
understanding the rhetoric involved can increase our 
understanding of the controversy in particular, as well as 
how science operates in general.
Selection of Texts
Although both Fleischmann and Pons and Jones initially 
agreed to submit papers simultaneously to Nature on March 
24, 1989, Fleischmann and Pons sent a brief paper to the 
Journal of Electroanalytical Chemistry on March 11. 
Following the University of Utah press conference on March 
23, Jones immediately sent his own paper to Nature. 
Fleischmann and Pons submitted another brief paper to 
Nature the next day, March 24, but subsequently withdrew 
that paper. Fleischmann and Pons's March 11 paper then 
appeared in the April issue of the Journal of 
Electroanalytical Chemistry; Jones's paper appeared that
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same month in the April 27, 1989, issue of Nature. A 
flurry of discursive activity followed these events, and my 
rhetorical analysis will focus on representative samples.
I will examine Fleischmann and Pons's first published 
article about their cold fusion discovery; Steven Jones's 
initial article about his own cold fusion discovery; 
several samples of scientific correspondence both in 
support of and critical of the Fleischmann and Pons claim; 
an editorial by Nature editor John Maddox; and finally one 
of the final published communications by Fleischmann and 
Pons about their cold fusion claims. These items come 
primarily from one source, the scientific journal Nature, 
for several reasons.
First, Nature was the choice of both Fleischmann and 
Pons and Steven Jones for their initial publications 
(although Fleischmann and Pons subsequently submitted their 
article elsewhere and had another version rejected by 
Nature). Secondly, because of its content of timely 
scientific discoveries and discussions and its weekly 
publication schedule, Nature became a forum for the cold 
fusion controversy; scientists could publish and read 
therein the latest breaking news about cold fusion.
Finally, Nature evolved into an intriguing and varied 
forum, in that alongside original research articles, one 
could find letters and editorials, all of which could have
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been read by scientists actually engaged in cold fusion 
research.
I depart from this forum on two instances, however, to 
include significant pieces of discourse. I include 
Fleischmann and Pons's article that appeared in the Journal 
of Electroanalytical Chemistry because it was the 
scientists' first published account of their cold fusion 
experiments, and it precipitated much of the cold fusion 
discourse. I also include one of their final articles, 
published in summer 1990 in the Journal of Fusion 
Technology, to examine the responses of Fleischmann and 
Pons to representative criticisms and also because the 
article addresses criticisms raised at one of the several 
conferences at which cold fusion was discussed to examine 
in what ways this criticism is addressed through written 
discouse.
While these texts are but a small sampling of the 
numerous papers, letters, editorials, and news items 
concerning cold fusion, those texts I have selected fairly 
represent the kinds of issues and arguments raised 
throughout the controversy and convey a valid sense of the 
debate. Significant media of cold fusion debate not 
addressed closely here (see above, however) are the 
numerous conferences and meetings held by chemists and 
physicists alike, many of which were identified in chapter 
one's timeline. Many conclusions about cold fusion claims
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were apparently reached at these gatherings, but the 
unavailability of accurate transcriptions precluded my 
examining these media in a rhetorical analysis.
The Original Research
Fleischmann and Pons's Article
Fleischmann and Pons's first cold fusion publication, 
"Electrochemically induced nuclear fusion of deuterium," 
appeared in the April 1989 issue of the Journal of 
Electroanalytical Chemistry. The article was not 
published, however, as a typical research paper; their 
eight-page work appeared as a "Preliminary note," an 
atypical entry into this journal, which usually publishes 
comprehensive research papers. As a preliminary note, the 
article failed to describe the experiment in sufficient 
detail to allow replication to confirm its results and 
contained no mention of the control experiments that are 
typical of this type of announcement. Journal editor 
Ronald Fawcett nevertheless named the paper "a very 
significant piece of science... definitely worth publishing 
as a preliminary communication" (Dagani 14).
As shown in chapter one's timeline, Pons and 
Fleischmann had submitted a similar paper to Nature that 
was rejected. The paper submitted to Nature was an even 
shorter version than that published by the Journal of 
Electroanalytical Chemistry (Dagani 14; Maddox, "Cold
Fusion" 604). Pons and Fleischmann declined requests by 
Nature to expand the data in their paper, taking, as Nature 
editor John Maddox described it, "the view that they could 
not at the same time satisfy the referees and get on with 
other urgent work" ("Cold Fusion" 604). The publication of 
the Fleischmann and Pons article as a note does not suggest 
that Fleischmann and Pons were uncertain of their claim; 
the term "Preliminary" does not in this case indicate 
"tentative" or "probing," but indicates an initial, first 
publication. Such a circumstance suggests that Fleischmann 
and Pons may have been seeking to be first with news of 
cold fusion, claiming the phenomenon as their own. Nature 
editor John Maddox raises this point in his criticisms of 
cold fusion, examined in detail later. Whatever their 
motivation, however, it is the certainty with which 
Fleischmann and Pons assert their claim that diminished the 
success of their article. The authors chose an 
unsuccessful rhetorical framework in which to announce 
their discovery and, in so doing, ignored many possible 
lines of argument— rhetorical topoi— against the 
reasonableness of their claims.
In terms of issues, Fleischmann and Pons situate their 
research firmly in the evidential framework, which concerns 
questions about the existence of phenomenon. All four 
subordinate stases, or issues— conjectural, definitional, 
qualitative, and translative— may be discovered in their
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article. Fleischmann and Pons establish the overall 
rhetorical impetus of their article as
evidential/conjectural, "Is there evidence for claim X?" at 
the conclusion of their brief "Introduction" with the 
question: "In view of the very high compression and
mobility" of deuterium in the palladium molecular lattice­
work, "would nuclear fusion...be feasible under these 
conditions?" which asks if scientific evidence exists for 
cold fusion. This research question, however, is similar to 
one that might easily begin a discussion that situates 
itself in the interpretative/conjectural stases and would 
in effect ask if any existing scientific construct, 
specifically nuclear fusion, could explain the experimental 
data that followed in the article. This interpretative 
approach, I argue later, might have been more rhetorically 
successful, but Fleischmann and Pons focus instead on the 
evidential.
The evidential framework is an unsuccessful one for 
Fleischmann and Pons because even though they fail to find 
conclusive scientific evidence, they remain convinced that 
they have indeed discovered cold nuclear fusion. By not 
finding evidence of the fusion products that one would 
expect to find based on accepted, current knowledge, 
however, Fleischmann and Pons are then forced to posit "an 
hitherto unknown nuclear process or processes," and fail to 
address successfully in their experimental framework the
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definitional stasis, "What does the evidence mean?" and the 
qualitative, "Which empirical judgments are warranted by 
the available evidence?"
The eight-page article is divided into the four 
sections typical of scientific papers: Introduction, 
Experimental, Results, and Discussion. As cited in chapter 
two, Medawar argues that this arrangement reinforces the 
notion of the scientists who posit a hypothesis— "would 
nuclear fusion...be feasible under these conditions?"— and 
then gather objective evidence until a conclusion is 
reached. This arrangement conforms with the 
evidential/conjectural framework, again which asks "Is 
there scientific evidence for claim X?" In such a 
framework, the scientists would then proceed, after having 
asked the research question, to set up experiments and 
gather evidence, which Fleischmann and Pons do.
In the next section of the article, "Experimental," 
Fleischmann and Pons fail to describe fully either their 
apparatus or its functions in order to facilitate 
replication by other scientists. They write only one 
sentence to describe the electrochemical cells containing 
the palladium electrodes submerged in the deuterium bath, 
focusing instead on how their experimental measurements of 
expected fusion rates were obtained. They describe four 
experiments. Given below are the first sentences from each 
of the four sections in "Experimental" that describe those
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four experiments. Where one would expect to find 
descriptions of experimental apparatus used to generate the 
phenomenon, one finds instead statements about how 
measurements were made, demonstrating Fleischmann and 
Pons's concern with the evidential;
(1) Calorimetric measurements of heat balances 
at low current densities...were made using....
(2) Calorimetric measurements of heat balances 
at higher current densities were carried out 
using....
(3) The spectrum of y-rays emitted from the 
water bath...was determined using....
(4) The rate of generation/accumulation of 
tritium was measured using....
By not describing fully their experimental apparatus, 
Fleischmann and Pons fail to address successfully the 
problem—solution topos of experimental replication, in 
which "scientific rhetors are expected to provide 
sufficiently detailed explanations of methods and 
procedures so that the experiment can be replicated 
accurately" {Prelli 189).
The products of nuclear fusion are well established in 
the scientific community: tritium, light hydrogen, helium
3, neutrons, and (heat) energy. Note that 2 of the 4 
experiments involved measured excess heat. Experiment (3) 
involved analysis of gamma—ray spectra (gamma—rays are 
produced when the neutron products of fusion are captured 
by hydrogen ions in the waterbath), and experiment (4) 
measured tritium production. Of the five products of 
nuclear fusion, Fleischmann and Pons describe measurements
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for only three- Noticeably missing is a measurement for 
helium. Fleischmann and Pons promise at the end of the 
Experimental section that results "for the mass 
spectroscopy of the evolved gases [the search for 
He]...will be given elsewhere," and this sentence is 
followed by a reference. The "elsewhere" refers to as yet 
(at the time) unsubmitted material by Fleischmann and Pons. 
Were one to evoke the topos of scientific corroboration, 
Fleischmann and Pons could be criticized for offering 
evidence that is yet to be established as accepted 
knowledge.
By situating their discourse in the 
evidential/conjectural framework and describing 
measurements for only 3 of the 5 products of fusion, one 
would expect, to assure rhetorical success, to see strong 
experimental evidence of those three measured products: 
heat, tritium, and neutrons. However, Fleischmann and Pons 
succeed in finding convincing evidence for only one fusion 
product.
Several features of the "Results" section are 
rhetorically interesting. First in this section, 
Fleischmann and Pons relate the results of their 
calorimetric measurements. In this section are two tables 
depicting excess enthalpy (heat) results based on current 
density and electrode size (and shape). In one experiment 
that ran in excess of 120 hours, a huge amount of heat was
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liberated. Fleischmann and Pons, in this "Results" 
section, make an observation that would seem better suited 
for the "Discussion" section; they declare that "it is 
inconceivable that this [heat release] could be due to 
anything but nuclear processes." It is clear from this 
remark that Fleischmann and Pons's foremost concern is 
establishing evidence that fusion is feasible.
In the last paragraph detailing the calorimetric 
results, the final, three-line sentence is bold-faced.
Just prior to this sentence, they had raised the 
possibility that introducing tritium into the bath mixture 
on the reactant side of the chemical equation might yield 
even greater amounts of excess heat. As a warning, the 
bold-faced sentence reports that "even using D20 
[deuterium] alone, a substantial portion of the cathode
fused (melting point 1554° C) , part of it vapourised,
and the cell and contents and a part of the fume cupboard 
housing the experiment were destroyed." The bold-faced 
text— the only to appear in the article— serves not only as 
a prudent, well-intentioned warning, but also calls 
attention to a dramatic demonstration of the amount of 
excess heat reported by Fleischmann and Pons. They thus 
establish that at least one fusion product, heat, is 
undoubtedly produced.
The results of experiment (3) deal with the gamma—ray 
spectra obtained near the waterbath that held the
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electrolytic cells. When the neutrons that are produced by 
fusion are captured by hydrogen ions in the deuterium bath, 
gamma—rays are emitted. Fleischmann and Pons report that 
"this spectrum confirms that 2.45 MeV neutrons are indeed 
generated in the electrodes." The value of 2.45 
micro/electron volts is the characteristic energy signature 
of an electron emerging from a fusion reaction. The 
discussion is accompanied by a figure depicting the 
spectrum signal-line, showing a peak at around 2.25 MeV 
(this spectrum figure will be criticized by Petrasso, et 
al, examined below). However, the results of the spectra 
analysis show that "the intensities of the spectra are 
weak," meaning that the neutron production detected by 
Fleischmann and Pons is much lower than would be expected 
were nuclear.fusion actually taking place.
The results of experiment (4) also note this low 
neutron flux; consistent with this low neutron production 
is the low accumulation in the electrolyte of the fusion 
product tritium. Spectra analysis indicated that tritium 
was indeed being produced. However, these low rates of 
production present a problem for Fleischmann and Pons, who 
confront this problem in the final paragraph of the results 
of experiment (4). Already established are the low neutron 
flux and, in agreement with this low flux, the low 
accumulation of tritium. "On the other hand, the data on 
enthalpy [heat] generation would require" neutron and
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tritium production in much greater amounts. In other 
words, to account for the excessive amounts of heat 
generation, one would have to conclude that the fusion 
reactions are occurring at rates much greater than either 
the evidence for neutron or tritium production indicates.
At this point, Fleischmann and Pons have reached a 
rhetorical impasse. Having couched their article strictly 
toward the evidential issue, they are confronted with the 
problem of maintaining their claim of cold fusion while 
reasonably accounting for these low neutron and tritium 
rates. The products of fusion— cold or hot— are well 
established. Since no known scientific construct can 
explain their data, they are forced into one conclusion:
"It is evident that [known fusion] reactions... are only a 
small part of the overall reaction scheme and that other 
nuclear processes must be involved."
In the Discussion section of their article,
Fleischmann and Pons address the evidential/definitional: 
"What does the evidence mean?" A close look at the 
language in the article shows that even though their 
evidence does not indicate fusion, Fleischmann and Pons 
leave no doubt as to what the evidence does indicate: "it
is inconceivable that this [heat] is due to anything but 
nuclear processes," so "it is evident... that other nuclear 
processes must be involved," and finally that "the bulk of 
the energy release is due to an hitherto unknown nuclear
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process or processes." In other words, Fleischmann and 
Pons are certain that room-temperature nuclear fusion is 
occurring, but in order to account for the low neutron and 
tritium production, they must claim further a nuclear 
fusion of an unconventional process. A claim of cold 
fusion is remarkable enough, but the Fleischmann and Pons 
claim is made even more extraordinary by their claiming an 
altogether new type of fusion reaction that yields fewer 
neutrons and less tritium than conventional physics allowed 
for. Rhetorically, then, their article fails because they 
have followed a framework that does not allow them to 
reasonably conclude that they have found evidence for what 
they claim to have observed.
Fleischmann and Pons introduce the evidentia1/ 
qualitative issue, which asks if the evidence proves a 
conclusion or merely suggests areas for further study, when 
they suggest further study: "evidently, it is necessary to
reconsider the quantum mechanics of electrons and deuterons 
in such host lattices [palladium]." However, Fleischmann 
and Pons suggest such research not because they feel their 
findings are inconclusive and that further research might 
suggest a means whereby their conclusion may find a fit 
with explanatory frameworks. They are actually suggesting 
further research so that explanatory frameworks may fit 
with their conclusions. As for evidential/qualitative 
concerns, Fleischmann and Pons have at best tentative
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evidence for a new type of nuclear fusion, and one could 
argue strongly that the evidence is not conclusive but at 
best may suggest probability. Again, their language, given 
above, suggests they feel otherwise.
The evidential/translative issue, which asks which 
evidence more reliably grounds claims about what does and 
does not exist, is raised implicitly by Fleischmann and 
Pons when they base their claim on the excess heat 
generation. For them, "it is inconceivable that this 
[excess heat] could be due to anything but nuclear 
processes." Obviously, they consider the evidence of heat 
the most important indicator, with neutron flux, gamma-ray 
production, and tritium generation considered subordinate 
proofs. Recall that helium measurements were not given in 
the article at all. This reliance on excess heat as their 
primary evidence left Fleischmann and Pons open to much 
criticism on those grounds. Also, the
evi dent i a1/1rans1at ive reliance on heat evidence plays a 
central role in other aspects of the cold fusion 
controversy and will be raised later in the analysis of 
Steven Jones' article.
Halloran has stated that "the job of the rhetorical 
critic is to discover what in the particular case were the 
available means of persuasion, and judge whether the rhetor 
managed them well or badly" (70). As demonstrated, the 
evidential framework was rhetorically unsuccessful for
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Fleischmann and Pons because inconclusive evidence prevents 
them from reasonably asserting the claim of cold fusion. 
However, as suggested earlier, another framework, the 
interpretative, might have promised more success, allowed 
Fleischmann and Pons to retain much of the information in 
their original article, and would have maintained their 
claim to the cold fusion discovery.
Fleischmann and Pons's question at the end of their 
"Introduction” asked, in effect, "Under these conditions, 
would cold nuclear fusion be feasible?" In order to 
reasonably answer that question, one would duplicate the 
conditions (compressed deuterium in a palladium molecular 
lattice-work) and evaluate the evidence. In the case of 
fusion, the products, or evidence, of fusion are well 
known. Fleischmann and Pons did indeed write their article 
along such lines. But although the evidence was not 
conclusive, they remained convinced that the answer to 
their question was "Yes, cold nuclear fusion is feasible—  
but of a 'hitherto unknown' kind." The question 
Fleischmann and Pons should have asked, however, is this: 
"Could cold nuclear fusion be a possible explanation of 
what happens under these conditions?" This question then 
moves the framework out of the evidential and into the 
interpretative: "Is there a scientifically meaningful
construct for interpreting evidence?" Fleischmann and Pons 
could then have proceeded to present their evidence of
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excess heat, low neutron flux, and low tritium generation 
as evidence that something unknown is happening that cannot 
be explained by existing scientific constructs regarding 
nuclear fusion. Fleischmann and Pons could then have 
offered that perhaps some unknown cold fusion reaction is 
taking place.
The difference between the two stances, though subtle, 
are rhetorically powerful. In their article, Fleischmann 
and Pons focus on their evidence as convincing proof of an 
unknown nuclear process, their paraphrased point claiming 
"We have conclusive evidence of an unknown nuclear 
process." More rhetorical success might have been theirs 
had they done something similar to what Watson and Crick 
did: "We would like to suggest the possibility that cold
nuclear fusion may be an explanation of the excess heat 
phenomenon...." The original, evidential stance invites 
confrontation: Is the evidence conclusive? What does the
evidence really mean? Are other explanations just as 
likely? Could chemical processes explain the phenomenon? 
One could also argue that the Fleischmann and Pons 
conclusion violates Ockham's razor, the philosophical 
principle that states that when two or more explanations 
are possible, the simplest is the most desirable. The most 
simple explanation of Fleischmann and Pons's results is 
that the heat is due to some chemical, and some known, 
reaction, and not to an unknown nuclear reaction.
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A letter of July 1989 to Nature by Bridge et al. ,
"Cold fusion ideas," suggests just that idea. "In the 
excitement" about cold fusion, they fear that "more 
conventional explanations from cognate fields" may be 
ignored. This line of argument is similar to the topos of 
simplicity, which holds that the most parsimonious 
interpretations are the most desirable. Again, the 
principle of Ockham's razor seems best to explain this line 
of argument.
On the other hand, by asking the interpretative 
question, "Could cold nuclear fusion be an explanation?" 
Fleischmann and Pons would seem both more scientifically 
reasonable, that is, asking if unexpected evidence could be 
explained by a particular construct, and would also elicit 
less of a confrontational reaction and more of a 
cooperative action. Having been given the evidence and 
asked the question, the scientific community could then 
join in with Fleischmann and Pons to determine conclusively 
if in fact nuclear fusion were taking place.
Fleischmann and Pons seemingly invoke this spirit of 
cooperation in the opening sentence to their Discussion 
section as they write, "We realize that the results 
reported here raise more questions than they provide 
answers, and that much further work is required on this 
topic." This first sentence is somewhat ironic in that 
Fleischmann and Pons could not have imagined just how many
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questions and what sorts— concerning not only their data 
and conclusions but also their methods and status as 
credible scientists— would be raised by both the lay and 
scientific community. In many cases, however, an important 
job of the scientist is simply to raise appropriate 
questions or suggest fruitful avenues of research. In 
Lakatos' philosophy of science, such activity may be 
essential for the success of a research program. In this 
case, however, it seems unlikely that Fleischmann and 
Pons's intent, even though their article did result in a 
flurry of cold fusion experimentation, was to indicate 
important avenues for further study. In fact, Fleischmann 
and Pons were widely criticized for the secrecy surrounding 
their experiments, their data, and their apparatus, as 
will be discussed later in the analysis of John Maddox's 
Nature editorial. Note, too, that in the interpretative 
framework Fleischmann and Pons could have related their 
experimental findings essentially as in the original 
article and could have been given credit for the discovery 
as well, had further evidence accumulated.
The Steven Jones Article
Steven Jones of Brigham Young University is the other 
primary researcher in the cold fusion controversy. His 
article appeared the same month as the initial Fleischmann 
and Pons article in the April 27 issue of Nature, a little
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more than a month after the University of Utah press 
conference. In his "Observation of cold nuclear fusion in 
condensed matter, " Jones also situates his discourse in the 
evidential framework; accordingly, to be successful at 
convincing as to the reasonableness of his claims, he must 
provide scientifically reasonable empirical evidence and 
draw reasonable conclusions. In doing so, Jones addresses 
the subordinate issues of conjectural and qualitative.
Jones addresses the conjectural issue by offering 
neutron production as his sole source of direct evidence.
No mention is made of any observations of excess heat 
crucial to the Fleischmann and Pons claim, and no 
measurements were made for helium and tritium. Helium and 
excess heat are discussed, however, but only in terms of 
"indirect evidence."
Jones describes that he arrived at his particular 
formula for making cold fusion from observations of 
"naturally occurring" Helium 3 being vented from the earth 
through volcanoes and fissures. If this Helium 3 were a 
sign of fusion, it would explain why the interior of the 
earth is hot, and could also explain why other planetary 
bodies, such as Jupiter, radiate more heat than they 
absorb.
What has all this to do with Jones's fusion 
experiment? In the next section, he explains that he has 
attempted to duplicate what may well take place in the
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earth's interior in his electrolytic cells. The cells 
contain a concoction of various "catalytic materials" 
including "salts typical of volcanic hot springs." Into 
this soup are inserted electrodes of either palladium or 
titanium, both known absorbers of hydrogen. Through 
electrolytic compression, the deuterium molecules absorbed 
into the electrodes— in theory— eventually fuse.
Jones is able, then, to use helium as evidence, but 
indirectly and in a way that derives rhetorical strength 
through the interpretative/conjectural framework, which 
asks if a scientific construct exists that may explain 
evidence. The high concentrations of Helium 3 associated 
with volcanoes "suggests fusion as a possible source for 
the 3He.1 He further uses the interpretative stance when 
he suggests that "it is interesting to consider whether 
cold fusion in the core of Jupiter... could account for its 
excess heat." Jones has then in fact used both Helium 3 
and heat as evidence, but as indirect, inductive evidence 
since Jones has modeled his experiment after those 
conditions and reports the observation of fusion. His 
couching such evidence in the interpretative framework 
averts any criticism that such fusion evidence has been 
ignored, but allows him to use it in a way that avoids 
confrontation as direct evidence of his own observations.
The lines of argument of experimental competency and 
replication are also addressed through detailed discussion
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of the neutron device— a device developed by Jones and the 
only one of its kind— the contents and operation of the 
electrolytic cells, and lengthy explanations of how neutron 
measurements were made while correcting for the naturally 
occurring background count. Through such a detailed 
explanation, Jones sought to diminish the possibility of 
criticism from the methodological/definitional issue, 
seeking to illustrate the proper use and placement of 
measuring instruments and care taken while gathering 
measurements.
However, Jones could still not escape criticism on 
this issue. Immediately following Jones's article in 
Nature, article referee John M. Carpenter commented on the 
problems of measuring neutron production over background 
count. Though Jones and his colleagues had acted correctly 
to subtract background readings of naturally occurring 
neutron radiation— mostly in the form of cosmic-rays—  
Carpenter suggests that the background count can vary 
greatly over time. Further, the energy of such "cosmic- 
ray-induced neutrons is at nearly the same energy as that 
expected from deuteron-deuteron fusion, 2.45 MeV."
This line of argument is also used by Nature editor 
John Maddox in his criticisms of cold fusion in an 
editorial that appears in the same issue as Jones's 
article. Maddox laments two facts: one, that Jones had
not foreseen the "need for contemporaneous controls" to
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limit the effects of changing background counts and, two, 
that the Brigham Young neutron detector is one of a kind. 
Maddox undermines Jones's cold fusion work by questioning 
the collection of neutron data and pointing out that 
replication of the Jones experiment is not possible. 
Interestingly, Maddox points out that Carpenter 
"provided... [his] comment at our invitation." No other 
article that appeared in that issue of Nature was 
accompanied by the referee's comments. The Maddox 
editorial is analyzed in detail below.
Having presented his evidence for cold fusion, Jones 
concludes with the claim that "the presence of a fusion 
neutron signal was consistently reproduced" through several 
runs of the fusion experiment. He calls for more work to 
"disentangle the factors that influence the fusion rate."
He also evokes the fruitfulness line of argument in his 
final sentence, emphasizing that even though the observed 
effect was small, it "opens the possibility, at least, of a 
new path to fusion energy."
The analysis of this article shows Jones's awareness 
of the need to structure his discourse to help render his 
claims reasonable and identify and disarm possible 
criticisms. Jones skillfully used the interpretative 
framework to include indirect evidence for his cold fusion 
claims, included detailed description of his apparatus in 
the attempt to diminish criticism, evokes a spirit of
124
cooperation to sort out factors in this new phenomenon, and 
points out, though cautiously, implications for future 
applications. In this circumstance, Jones seems the best 
rhetor compared to Fleischmann and Pons, and indeed his 
article and claims drew less criticism.
The Issue of Evidence
One other issue implicit in both the Fleischmann and 
Pons and the Jones paper that informs the cold fusion 
controversy involves concerns about which evidence more 
reliably grounds the claims to cold nuclear fusion. While 
Fleischmann and Pons based their conclusions almost 
entirely upon excess heat, Steven Jones grounded his fusion 
claims on neutron detection. Fleischmann and Pons drew 
much criticism about this emphasis on excess heat, 
especially from physicists. It is not surprising, though, 
that Fleischmann and Pons, being chemists, would be more 
concerned with the heat results than with either neutron 
flux or gas spectrum analysis. Heat production falls more 
in the realm of chemistry; physics deals more with particle 
detection and spectrum analysis. Recall from the timeline 
that Clayton Callis, ACS president, remarked that, "it 
appears chemists have come to the rescue" of the physicists 
who had so far failed in attempts at cold fusion 
("Scientific" 605). At a seminar in Geneva, Carlo Rubbia, 
a Nobel Prize winner for work in elementary particles,
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remarked that "this was the first time that a chemist had 
discovered a neutron" (Peat 91).
This major feature of the controversy involves 
arguments along the evidential/translative stasis and pits 
chemists against physicists: one group looked for evidence
in a typically chemical product, heat, while another looked 
at physics products, particle production and gas spectrum 
analysis. During the rapid exchange of confirmations and 
refutations that soon followed the reports of cold fusion, 
"it sometimes seemed the physicists were accusing the 
chemists of not knowing how to detect a neutron or properly 
measure a gamma ray, to which the chemists would respond 
that the physicists did not understand how to run an 
electrochemical cell" (Peat 77).
Some confusion and miscommunication across disciplines 
should be expected, as suggested in chapter two in the 
discussion of Kuhn's disciplinary matrix, in which each 
discipline holds its own models and values for establishing 
knowledge, and also by Lyne and Howe, who predict 
miscommunication when scientists communicate with others 
outside their field. While no evidence of miscommunication 
was found, the analysis suggests that scientists may fail 
to identify properly the issues of concern from disciplines 





Several letters appeared in the same issue of Nature 
in which Jones's article appeared, two of which address the 
problem of low neutron flux in Fleischmann and Pons's 
evidence. Both, interestingly, address the interpretative 
stasis.
One, by Peroni Paolo, begins, "From the newspaper 
accounts, the very small flux of neutrons generated during 
the experiment of Fleischmann and Pons is being taken as 
proof that their conclusion is not valid" (Paolo 711).
He addresses the interpretative/conjectural issue by 
offering a process "first recognized by Oppenheimer and 
Phillips in 1935" that could explain the low neutron flux; 
that is, Paolo suggests a scientifically meaningful 
construct for interpreting the low neutron flux measured by 
Fleischmann and Pons: "when the kinetic energy is as small 
as in their [Fleischmann and Pons's] experiment...the 
nucleus of the target atom repels the proton but not the 
neutron. Thus, the neutron can be captured by the nucleus 
while the proton... will fly off....It follows that if the 
experiments described really brought the deuterium nuclei 
close enough together to interact, one should expect no 
neutron emission and a reaction rate much higher...."
The other letter, by Franceso Premuda, also addresses 
the interpretative/conjectural stasis. His letter begins,
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"Reports of the experiments by Fleischmann and Pons contain 
a paradox— that, if fusion reactions do occur in them, 
either too much energy is liberated or too few neutrons are 
detected. I wish to supply a possible explanation."
Premuda goes on to offer his "hypothesis" that some regions 
within the palladium latticework are more dense than 
others, inhibiting particle movement; the product particles 
of fusion will then "remain trapped inside....[and] the 
reactive particles such as neutrons and 3H will only 
infrequently be released to the environment." In terms of 
the interpretative/conjectural issue, Premuda also offers a 
scientific construct by which the Fleischmann and Pons 
interpretation of the low neutron flux may be considered 
scientifically reasonable.
Cold Fusion Criticism
Fleischmann and Pons, of course, were not without 
their critics. Petrasso et al. submitted a letter that 
appeared in the May 18, 1989, issue of Nature (Petrasso, 
"Problems"). In the June 29, 1989, issue of Nature, 
Fleischmann and Pons reply to these criticisms, and this 
letter is followed immediately by a reply by Petrasso et 
al. This exchange of correspondence offers an excellent 
opportunity to analyze the type of discourse involved as 
scientists argue. In this particular series of exchanges, 
the discussion never moves beyond the evidential/
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conjectural issue, arguing about whether evidence for
fusion exists, and never into the definitional (what does
the evidence mean) or thecrualitative (which judgments are
warranted by the evidence) or the translative (which type
of evidence reliably grounds the claims).
The first letter by Petrasso et al. (Petrasso,
"Problems") addresses the evidential/conjectural, primarily
through the line of argument of experimental competency:
As compelling evidence that fusion had occurred, 
they [Fleischmann and Pons] reported the 
observation of the 2.22 MeV y—ray line that 
originates from neutron capture by hydrogen 
nuclei....We argue that the claim of Fleischmann 
et al. to have observed the 2.22 MeV line 
characteristic of [fusion] reaction... is 
unfounded.
Petrasso et al. criticize the Fleischmann and Pons 
interpretation "on the basis of three quantitative 
considerations." First, the peak in the gamma—ray signal 
line at 2.22 MeV is far too narrow, for two reasons. One, 
based on gamma—ray spectra equations, the width of the 
reported peak "is a factor of two below the predicted 
value." This criticism raises the line of argument of 
external consistency, which demands that observations 
correspond with accepted knowledge. Two, the signal line 
is too narrow when one considers the resolution that 
Fleischmann and Pons's detector would allow. Given their 
instrumentation, Fleischmann and Pons could not have 
observed a peak of such a width at the 2.22 MeV wavelength.
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Second, Petrasso et al. assert that the peak trace had the 
wrong profile for a fusion gamma-ray. Missing from the 
published signal line is "clearly defined Compton edge, " a 
characteristic smaller peak produced when gamma-rays 
undergo a characteristic wavelength shift due to the 
Compton Effect. Again, the Fleischmann and Pons signal 
line interpretation fails to meet external consistency, for 
any such signal line with a gamma-ray peak at 2.22 MeV 
should show the characteristic smaller leading peak at 1.99 
MeV.
Third, Petrasso et al. argue that, even though 
Fleischmann and Pons reported a low neutron flux, the 
neutron rate that they do report is "too large by a factor 
of 50" over what one should expect over background rate. 
This line of argument relies on the topos of accuracy.
Thus Petrasso et al. criticize the Fleischmann and Pons 
evidence through the arguments of misreading 
instrumentation, lacking expected consistency with 
accepted knowledge (the Compton Edge issue), and measuring 
inaccurately.
Fleischmann and Pons reply to Petrasso et al. in a 
letter ("Measurement") that appeared in Nature some five 
weeks later and defend themselves and their data by 
quickly asserting that "the basis of the [Petrasso et al.] 
critique was the nature of a y-ray spectrum displayed 
during a television broadcast." Also in the opening
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paragraph, the scientists remark on Petrasso et al.' s 
"somewhat strange approach to the collection of scientific 
data, " and contend that, in fact, the gamma-ray spectrum 
taken from the television and used in the Petrasso et al. 
letter "most certainly was not made in these laboratories." 
They go on to conclude that a "curious structure" in the 
spectrum criticized in the Petrasso et al. letter "is 
simply the trace of a screen cursor on the multi-channel 
analyzer visual display unit!" Rhetorically, Fleischmann 
and Pons defend themselves by attacking Petrasso et al.'s 
ethos, suggesting that they acted in an unscientific manner 
by obtaining data from an unscientific source and then 
using that questionable data as the basis for the critique, 
and by attacking Petrasso et al.'s competence by the 
embarrassing error of mistaking a cursor trace as a feature 
of the spectrum. They then produce a complete set of 
spectra obtained from their experiments; however, in this 
set of spectra, the gamma-ray peak appears not at 2.22 MeV 
as in their original publication, but at 2.496 MeV. 
Fleischmann and Pons go on to acknowledge some problems 
"underlying the interpretation of these spectra," but 
contend that "removal of the [fusion] cells leads to the 
removal of the signal peak" and that this evidence, in and 
of itself, is strong evidence of fusion.
As for the lack of the Compton edge, Fleischmann and 
Pons conclude that "the size and energy of the signal peak
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imply that any associated Compton edge...will be lost 
beneath the rest of the spectrum."
In the reply, Petrasso et al. ("Reply”) focus on two 
aspects of the Fleischmann and Pons letter. First,
Petrasso et al. defend against the attack on ethos raised 
by Fleischmann and Pons, maintaining that "they... claim, 
erroneously, that their televised y—ray spectrum was the 
basis of our analysis." Petrasso et al. point out that 
their critique was actually based on quantitative analysis 
of the signal lines first published by Fleischmann and 
Pons, controlled neutron—emission experiments that yielded 
gamma—ray spectra that were used as a basis of comparison 
for the Fleischmann and Pons spectra, and the known 
properties, specifically the resolution, of neutron 
detection instruments. Petrasso et al. successfully defend 
themselves against the questions of ethos by giving 
detailed accounts of the reasoning behind their critiques 
based on evidence unrelated to the televised spectra.
Petrasso et al. charge further that Fleischmann and 
Pons "fail to address our key criticisms" and then point 
to the unexplained change in signal line from the original 
claim of 2.22 MeV to 2.496 MeV, contending that 
"unfortunately, they [Fleischmann and Pons] are unable to 
identify the nuclear process that generates this 2.4 6—MeV 
y—ray," or to account for its unusual profile. Petrasso
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et al. conclude that the "signal line is an instrumental 
artefact unrelated to y-ray interaction."
Petrasso et al. place their criticism squarely in the 
issue of evidential/conjectural, attacking the foundation 
of the Fleischmann and Pons claim. Because Fleischmann and 
Pons chose to argue their claim along evidential/ 
conjectural lines, the merit of any claim they make is 
seriously undermined by questioning their evidence, 
evidence that at first was inconclusive and then, as seen 
above, seems to inexplicably shift.
The Nature Editorial
As suggested earlier, one of the interesting aspects 
of Nature as a forum for scientific discourse is its 
diversity. One can find therein original research 
articles, scientific correspondence, such as the 
Fleischmann and Pons/Petrasso exchange above, scientific 
news, and also scientific views. An example of the latter 
appeared in the April 27, 1989, issue as a full page 
editorial by editor John Maddox, entitled "What to Say 
about Cold Fusion." The Maddox editorial is an important 
piece of discourse to the cold fusion controversy because 
it evokes many of the lines of argument against cold fusion 
claims which are inappropriate in research articles of such 
hard sciences as electrochemistry and physics. Nonetheless, 
the Maddox editorial injects these arguments into hard
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sciences discourse because its editorial opinion is 
published alongside original, refereed research.
Therefore, one must conclude that such editorials influence 
the scientific community's thinking and attitudes towards 
the research being published there as well.
For example, a tag line beneath the heading of the 
Maddox editorial reads "Public interest in recent 
excitements is to be welcomed, especially if it does not 
turn to anger when attempts to replicate the observation of 
cold fusion fail— the most probable outcome." It is 
obvious that the Nature editorial, just from this one tag 
line, casts serious doubt concerning claims of cold fusion. 
The implications on the community's discourse becomes even 
more apparent considering the possible influence on 
subsequent letter-writers such as Petrasso, above (whose 
initial critique of the Fleischmann and Pons gamma-ray data 
would not appear for another month; the Fleischmann and 
Pons reply/Petrasso reply would not appear for another two 
months), and even more so when one considers the impact of 
this editorial on the possible reaction to Steven Jones' 
article: the Maddox editorial appears on page 701; Jones'
article appears on page 737— of that same issue.
In "What to say about cold fusion, 1 Maddox's 
discussion invokes several lines of argument. He praises 
institutions and practices that have upheld the standards 
and values shared by the scientific community, and he takes
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to task Fleischmann and Pons, and to a lesser degree Steven 
Jones. While re-affirming specifically scientific values 
and practices, he demonstrates how cold fusion's primary 
researchers have violated scientific conventions and 
behavior.
Maddox begins by complimenting Fleischmann and Pons on 
having "done at least one great service for the common 
cause," tongue-in-cheek praise for their having raised 
public interest and curiosity in the sciences and notes the 
"remarkably good-humoured" questions raised by the lay 
public about the truth of the cold fusion claims. Maddox 
finds it "remarkable that so many people are willing to 
accept that experimental observations, and the inferences 
drawn from them, acquire validity only by replication," and 
here raising the first topos and making his first 
affirmation about the process of science.
He credits in particular the "daily press, which has 
risen superbly to the challenge of cold fusion," that 
challenge being discussing cold fusion "in cautious 
language, making it plain that cold fusion was not then a 
proven reality." This line of argument, of course, appeals 
to the value of experimental replication. Some newspapers 
are praised for having demonstrated both "zeal and 
sobriety," characteristics that would also reflect well on 
a scientist's ethos.
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One explanation for the widespread interest, Maddox 
observes, "seems to be the general delight that a couple of 
people in widely separated universities have used their own 
money to pull off a trick on which governments have 
lavished huge sums of money in the past 30 years, so far 
without result." In this paragraph, the tone and attitude 
of Maddox are evident that he uses throughout the article. 
Maddox seems to be appealing to some sense of rooting for 
the underdog, a victory for the little man over big 
government, resulting in "a general delight." Note also 
that in keeping with this facetious tone and general 
pessimism about the cold fusion claims, he terms those 
claims "pull off a trick." Governments "have lavished," 
with all the connotations of excess, luxury, extravagance, 
and squander, not invested "huge sums of money" into fusion 
research, which suggests that perhaps the huge sums of 
money have been somehow wasted. Fleischmann and Pons are 
referred to as "a couple of people," stripping them of 
their scientific status.
More explicit criticism of both Fleischmann and Pons 
and Jones is made through the topos of experimental 
competence, a recurring line of argument in the cold fusion 
controversy. Because of the cold fusion controversy in 
general, Maddox argues, "the scientific community's 
reputation is vulnerable in several respects...not the 
least of which is that neither...group... carried out the
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rudimentary control experiment of running their 
electrolytic cells with ordinary rather than heavy water." 
Maddox wonders how one would ever explain this oversight to 
the students who have been trained "thatr control 
experiments should be as conspicuous in the design of an 
investigation as those believed to display the phenomenon 
under study," and how to "explain the neglect...to the 
world at large."
Maddox next attacks the ethos of Fleischmann and Pons 
through the topos of disinterestedness, which questions the 
legitimacy of scientist's motives. The line of argument 
follows that credible scientists set aside their own 
interests and are "devoted to pursuit of 'science for 
science's sake'" (Prelli 132). Maddox argues that 
Fleischmann and Pons, and Jones, have instead put at risk 
the reputation of the scientific community in favor of 
claiming cold fusion for themselves. Further, Fleischmann 
and Pons's "self-imposed secrecy" has hampered attempts at 
replication, and the lack of control experiments is a 
"glaring lapse from accepted practice" that is "another 
casualty of people's need to be first with reports of 
discovery and with the patents that follow." Maddox here 
makes explicit the suspicion abroad in the scientific 
community and surmised in numerous science-news journals 
that Fleischmann and Pons rushed into publication in order 
to secure patent rights.
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In citing "people's need to be first with reports of 
discovery," Maddox implicitly reminds the reader of the 
Fleischmann and Pons news conference, an action that can be 
criticized by the topos of communality, that is, of 
involving members outside the scientific community in 
scientific matters. Had Fleischmann and Pons followed 
scientific convention, their discovery would have been 
announced in a refereed journal. Prelli suggests that 
"scientists denounce with special severity the scientific 
reasonableness of research" if the scientists appear to be 
in "complicity with the laity" (Prelli 132).
This "need to be first" also opens another line of 
analysis that enriches Maddox's editorial. Pons and 
Fleischmann's initial article in the Journal of 
Electroanalytical Chemistry was not published as a typical 
research paper; their eight—page work appeared as a 
"Preliminary note," an atypical entry into this journal.
As such, the article failed, as Maddox has pointed out, to 
describe the experiment in sufficient detail to allow 
replication to confirm its results, and contained no 
mention of the control experiments that Maddox has 
correctly argued are typical of this type of announcement.
As stated in chapter one's timeline, Pons and 
Fleischmann had submitted a similar paper to Nature that 
was rejected. The paper submitted to Nature was an even
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shorter version than that published by the Journal of 
Electroanalytical Chemistry (Dagani 14; Maddox, "Cold 
Fusion" 604). Pons and Fleischmann declined to expand 
their paper, taking, as Maddox put it, "the view that they 
could not at the same time satisfy the referees and get on 
with other urgent work" ("Cold Fusion" 604). Maddox 
carefully indicated at that time, however, that "the non- 
appearance of the [Fleischmann and Pons] article must not 
be taken to imply that the experiments... are inherently 
less believable than those of Jones" (whose article was, of 
course, accepted by Nature) ("Cold Fusion" 604).
In this editorial, however, Maddox makes it clear that 
"the Utah phenomenon is literally unsupported by the 
evidence, could be an artefact and, given its 
improbability, is most likely to be one." It is unclear 
what has happened in the interim that would explain so 
radical a change in position.
However, the theme of "improbability" is evoked twice 
by Maddox. Earlier in this same editorial, he admits that 
"the Fleischmann and Pons experiments raise bigger 
questions, if only because the scale of the phenomenon they 
report is so much greater." Here, Maddox argues that 
"given its improbability," the claim is most likely false 
because it claims too much. If Maddox is reflecting a 
theme at large in the general scientific community, one may 
term it the topos of plausibility, in which case the lay
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connotations of reasonable— plausible, likely, moderate, 
and sensible— would translate into scientific 
reasonableness. If such is the case, it explains one of 
the reasons why Jones' claims, in which the fusion rates 
are much lower than Fleischmann and Pons, are the more well 
accepted and less criticized. Jones' claims would be 
considered the more scientifically reasonable because they 
suggest less disruption to accepted knowledge concerning 
nuclear fusion than Fleischmann and Pons's claims, which 
require proposing a new type of nuclear fusion.
Fleischmann and Pons's Response
One of the final communications of Fleischmann and 
Pons detailing their cold fusion experiments was published 
in the July 1990 issue of the Journal of Fusion Technology. 
Here, they "enumerate...the major criticisms that have been 
made and compare them to our actual procedures." They 
enumerate seven major criticisms that have questioned their 
competence as experimenters. Interestingly, Fleischmann 
and Pons seem more concerned about the criticisms that have 
arisen from press accounts than those raised in scientific 
forums (the latter receive only parenthetical comment): 
"there have been numerous comments in the press (and some 
in the scientific literature) about the accuracy of our 
methods, and, therefore, the validity of our results." Of 
course, Fleischmann and Pons are acutely aware of the
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critiques directed towards them over the
evidential/conjectural issue. Following is an analysis of 
their responses to their critics.
Responses II.A. & B. confront criticisms along the 
lines of experimental competence that question the care 
with which Fleischmann and Pons handled the gases that 
issued from the electrochemical cells and whether purity 
was maintained in the deuterium water bath. Fleischmann 
and Pons maintain that great care was taken on both counts 
through the design and close monitoring of their apparatus.
Response II.C., "Inadequate Mixing of the Electrolyte 
Leading to Marked Temperature Differences in the Cell," 
addresses the arguments of experimental competence made by 
Cal Tech chemist Nathan Lewis at the May meeting of the 
American Physical Society held in Baltimore. Working with 
a physicist and several coworkers, Lewis built a model of 
the Fleischmann and Pons apparatus. Since no details of 
the apparatus had been given, Lewis constructed the fusion 
device "using press photos and estimating dimensions from 
human arms in those photos" (Dagani 12). Lewis reported 
having performed several cold fusion experiments, finding 
no evidence of neutrons, gamma—rays, tritium, helium, or 
excess heat. Lewis did discover, though, the ease of 
committing errors in running such experiments, one of which 
was unreliable heat readings if the electrolyte in the 
cells is not stirred ("Secret Life" 88; Lindley, "More than
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Skepticism" 4). Lewis said that the precision of heat 
measurements is "highly dependent on exactly where you 
place the thermometer and how well stirred the electrolyte 
is" (Dagani 18). This criticism is especially relevant 
because, in this case, it is a chemist telling Fleischmann 
and Pons that they have not run their electrolytic cell 
properly.
This criticism of experimental competence is situated 
in the methodological/definitional framework because the 
issue concerns the proper operation of an electrolytic cell 
in which heat measurements are made. Fleischmann and Pons 
reply to this criticism by explaining that stirring is 
accomplished by the bubbling solution; in effect, the 
electrolyte stirs itself through "gas sparging," and a dye 
added to the solution demonstrates a quick dispersal 
throughout the cell.
Response II.D., "Inadequate Control of Water Bath Can 
Produce Errors," is interesting in that "although this 
aspect does not appear to have been raised in the 
literature, we comment on it here as a possible critique of 
our and other work." This response shows Fleischmann and 
Pons as practicing scientific rhetors, here attempting to 
reduce the possibility of criticism along the lines of 
experimental competence. They focus on what they consider 
the important details of their cell apparatus and describe 
briefly the pumps and mechanism used to maintain water
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levels, and then point out that "the control that we 
achieved may be contrasted to that in other published work, 
for example, ± 0.08°C." Fleischmann and Pons list their 
temperature fluctuations at "less than ±0.003°C," thereby 
demonstrating that they maintained stricter control in 
their cells than many of their critics.
Fleischmann and Pons's sections II.E. and II.F. again 
address the methodological/definitional issue, arguing the 
proper application of and use of values in chemical 
equations used for measuring heat transfer.
Section II.G. reveal Fleischmann and Pons's reaction 
to Maddox's editorial, reviewed above: "We believe the
allegations in Nature that we had not carried out blank 
[control] experiments before the publication of our 
preliminary note have been one of the principal factors 
preventing a logical development of research in this area 
and in polarizing attitudes." Of rhetorical importance is 
Fleischmann and Pons's clear perception that lines of 
scientific research have been hampered, not by lack of 
merit of either their evidence or their claims, but by 
allegations made in an editorial that questions their 
failure to maintain experimental competence and uphold the 
values of science. Not only has research been impeded, but 
evidence exists that scientists have taken sides on the 
issue, based, again, not on the merits of claim making or 
evidence but failure to include descriptions of control
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experiments and apparatus that would allow others to 
replicate the experiment.
In answer to Maddox's criticism, Fleischmann and Pons 
indicate that "these allegations are difficult to 
understand since the preliminary publication did in fact 
contain one blank experiment.... Our view has always been 
that...[a cell that does not show excess heat] is the most 
appropriate blank." Perhaps Fleischmann and Pons's 
definition of control experiment differs from Maddox's. 
Maddox called for an experiment conducted in light water 
instead of heavy, deuterized water. Fleischmann and Pons 
consider the control to be a cell that shows no excess 
heat, against which cells that do exhibit heat may be 
compared. This issue, the methodological/translative. 
arises over concerns about which experimental methods will 
yield the best evidence. Fleischmann and Pons are 
satisfied that blanks are appropriate for controls; Maddox 
feels otherwise. In either case, this dispute has been 
responsible for much of the controversy involving cold 
fusion research. Fleischmann and Pons conclude by 
generally dismissing "most of the speculations" about their 
experiments and conclusions as "exaggerated at least."
A study of the rhetoric involved in this controversy 
suggests that Fleischmann and Pons had at their disposal 
the rhetorical means to avert the nature of many of those 
speculations. A paper with the content of their last, but
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published earlier— and so without the need for the 
defensive posturing— might have averted much damage to the 
credibility of both Fleischmann and Pons and cold fusion 
research generally. Fleischmann and Pons also demonstrate 
a seeming unawareness of many issues and lines of argument 
that they fail to address until much damage has been done 
to the line of research, not the least of which are 
experimental competence and replication. The rhetorical 
analysis further demonstrates that philosophical and 
sociological aspects enter into the scientific discourse.
I examine the implications of these observations in the 
next chapter.
Chapter Five: Conclusions and Implications
On March 18, 1989, Martin Fleischmann and Stanley Pons 
touched off a scientific controversy by announcing at a 
University of Utah press conference the discovery of room 
temperature nuclear fusion, which promised an abundant 
source of clean, cheap energy. This dissertation attempts 
to discover in what ways this cold fusion controversy may 
be considered rhetorical in nature and in what ways 
understanding the rhetoric involved can increase our 
understanding of the controversy in particular, as well as 
the way science operates in general. To accomplish this 
task, I have summarized the circumstances surrounding the 
controversy, reviewed relevant literature to establish 
lines of thought that suggest a rhetorical element in the 
practice of science, synthesized a working theory of 
rhetorical analysis, and applied that theory to discursive 
artifacts arising from the controversy.
Evident in this discourse is the rhetorical element in 
the practice of science; considering this element, I 
venture here a definition of scientific rhetoric: the
activity of science whereby knowledge claims and ideas are 
disseminated and mediated among scientists in an attempt to 
establish the soundness of those claims and ideas. In the 
occurrence of conflicting evidence for cold fusion, the 
scientists, through their discourse, exchanged the
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findings they deemed relevant, addressed the issues they 
determined that needed attention, and raised lines of 
argument they found central to the investigation, all in 
the attempt to determine the soundness of Fleischmann and 
Pons's claims.
The exchange of letters in Nature concerning cold 
fusion indicate that science involves more than gathering 
empirical evidence and interpreting findings. Scientists 
frequently exchange information and debate about which 
scientific constructs are more fruitful for application, if 
existing constructs can explain unusual or unexpected data, 
the competence of experimentation, and so on. Fueling the 
cold fusion controversy was the fact that although 
experiments are typically replicable, cold fusion cells 
sometimes seemed to work and sometimes did not; some labs
reported some evidence in some cells; some labs would see
evidence sometimes; and others reported nothing. However, 
failure to detect fusion did not disprove the Fleischmann 
and Pons claim, for as one journalist observed, "the
absence of evidence is not evidence of absence, and
negative results are as open to doubt as any others" {"The 
Secret Life" 90). Thus, the mediating role of rhetoric is 
made evident as scientists attempt to agree, in this 
instance, at what point falsification is reached. Further, 
such exchanges provide evidence of the critical discourse 
that Popper suggested was so central in arriving at
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"truth," demonstrating rhetoric's central role in 
disseminating and mediating knowledge claims among 
scientists.
This definition also accommodates the concept that 
while a rhetoric of science is not a philosophy, sociology, 
or history of science, it agrees with such. This rhetoric 
is an overarching element that draws upon and is 
inextricably bound to the philosophy and sociology of 
science, as well as procedures for inquiry and knowledge 
production, the concerns of the rhetoric of inquiry. Two 
elements that appeared in the cold fusion discourse 
demonstrate this overarching nature of scientific rhetoric.
First, a line of argument that I identified and termed 
"plausibility" appears in the cold fusion discourse and may 
reflect a value held at large by the scientific community. 
In this line of argument, the lay connotations of 
reasonable—  plausible, likely, moderate, sensible— would 
translate into scientific reasonableness. For instance, 
Maddox argues that "given the improbability" of Fleischmann 
and Pons's claims, they are likely false (604). Such a 
line of thought offers one explanation of why Jones was 
received more positively than Fleischmann and Pons, for his 
claims of fusion were more modest by a factor of ten and 
suggested less disruption to accepted knowledge.
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Second, related to but not identical to this argument
of plausibility is what I term "scientific inertia," the
seeming reluctance of scientists to accept new claims that
may seem far afield of claims allowed by current lines of
thinking and investigation. Kuhn has pointed out, for
instance, that when current theory fails to explain new
evidence, the individual scientist's own ingenuity and
apparatus are questioned, not the shared values and
assumptions of the specific scientific community; Lakatos
posited the existence of the "hard core" of scientific
knowledge that is not subject to modification, even though
research programs may shift lines of investigation.
Further evidence of what I termed scientific inertia is
found in the concluding item of a 198 9 Department of Energy
Energy Research Advisory Board (ERAB) report on funding for
cold nuclear fusion. Though the ERAB reported that "it is
not possible at this time to state categorically that all
the claims for cold fusion have been convincingly either
proved or disproved," the ERAB concluded that
Nuclear fusion at room temperature, of the type 
discussed in this report, would be contrary to 
all understanding gained of nuclear reactions in 
the last half century; it would require the 
invention of an entirely new nuclear process.
(Goodwin 45).
It is clear that "the invention of an entirely new nuclear 
process" is not at all considered a positive circumstance. 
This scientific inertia is a worrisome philosophical and 
sociological phenomenon that is evidenced through
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scientific discourse, worrisome because it apparently 
places barriers in the way of scientific progress and could 
conceivably stifle scientific and technological 
achievement.
The appearances of the "plausibility" line of argument 
and of scientific inertia demonstrate the inter­
relationships of rhetoric with the philosophy and sociology 
of science. Scientific rhetors must look to the way 
science works and scientists work together in order to 
discover the available means of presenting their claims and 
ideas as scientifically reasonable. Kuhn's and Lakatos's 
philosophies predicted the plausibility argument and 
scientific inertia; the wise rhetor, then, should include 
in his or her discourse elements to overcome the reluctance 
to accept radical claims or to demonstrate the benefits of 
redirecting current research programs and lines of 
thinking. The close study of cold fusion discourse reveals 
elements of scientific philosophy and sociology.
Therefore, the discourse may serve as well to illuminate 
the actual practices and behaviors of scientists. All the 
above conclusions have implications in the rhetoric of 
inquiry, whose concern is structuring human inquiry and 
building knowledge.
Though I maintain that science necessarily contains a 
rhetorical element, neither my definition nor my rhetorical 
analysis go so far as to suggest that science or the body
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of scientific knowledge is wholly rhetorical, or, on the 
other hand, suggest the least that science merely includes 
some amount of rhetorical activity. As cited in chapter 
three, McMullin maintains that science has two faces, 
rhetoric being one. The other involves the logic of 
experimentation and data collection. In the case of cold 
fusion, had corroborating evidence never surfaced, no 
amount of rhetoric could have convinced the body of 
scientists that the process of cold fusion actually worked. 
The empirical aspects of experimentation and observation 
serve as a check and guardian against such a circumstance. 
Yet, asked the question, "Do scientific writers structure 
their discourse to accommodate relevant issues and lines of 
argument in order to convince their audience as to the 
scientific reasonableness of their claims?" one may quickly 
and decisively answer "Yes."
This line of argument raises definite epistemological 
questions. However, answering these questions is beyond 
the scope of a rhetorical analysis. For just as the 
rhetoric of science is not a philosophy or sociology, but 
agrees with the tenets of such, the rhetoric of science is 
not itself an epistemology of science, a point proven by 
its ability to agree with many epistemological stances. 
Hikins and Zagacki have shown that rhetoric is 
commensurable with realist positions through the theory of 
rhetorical perspective. Neither verificationists nor
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subjectivists would argue with a rhetorical element in
science. The proponents of what Berlin termed the New
Rhetoric or Epistemic Rhetoric believe language is an
integral part of shaping and producing knowledge. Even the
rationalist Popper admits the importance of critical
discourse in the search for truth:
It is only the idea of truth which allows us to 
speak sensibly of... rational criticism, and which 
makes rational discussion possible— that is to 
say, critical discussion in search of mistakes 
with the serious purpose of eliminating as many 
of these mistakes as we can, in order to get 
nearer to the truth. (Popper, "Conjectures" 229)
Popper's role for critical discussion agrees with the
definition of scientific rhetoric that I offered in the
beginning of this chapter: exchanging evidence, raising
issues, and identifying relevant lines of argument to
establish the soundness of knowledge claims. Obvious from
both the rhetorical analysis of cold fusion discourse and
in Popper's discussion is that scientists do engage in
rhetoric while "doing" science. For scientists, however,
that rhetoric is combined with the empirical logic of
experimentation and observation. The question, then, of
whether scientists produce "scientific truth" or "probable
knowledge" is a red herring for the rhetorical critic. As
suggested in chapter two, the question "Is cold fusion a
reality?" differs from "Do scientists engage in rhetoric?"
Further, depending on one's epistemological bent, truth and
probable knowledge are not mutually exclusive concepts, so
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in some contexts, such a question is not only unanswerable, 
but may be even, if you will, unaskable. The 
epistemological question that may interest rhetorical 
critics, however, is "How might one's epistemological 
stance influence one's rhetorical choice?" For instance, 
if rhetors see the scientist's role as producer of truth 
rather than interpreter of evidence, they may choose to 
address issues from the evidential framework more so than 
those from the interpretative. I suggest later that this 
notion may explain Fleischmann and Pons's rhetorical 
choices.
This line of thinking also suggests a caveat for the 
rhetorical critic against applying his or her own 
epistemological position to the text under analysis. For 
instance, while the Epistemic Rhetoric that Berlin 
describes embodies a popular position among humanities 
scholars, who frequently conduct rhetorical analyses, such 
a position may not be popular among chemists and 
physicists. Perhaps humanities scholars are more amenable 
to the notion of the pervasive nature of language because 
language is their tool. Chemists and physicists, however, 
have, as McMullin has suggested, another tool: the logic of 
experimentation and observation. The rhetorical critic 
must strive to learn how that methodology may influence 
rhetorical choice. To understand deeply the full range of 
rhetorical choices open to a scientific rhetor (or any
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other rhetor, for that matter), one should be aware of that 
rhetor's own epistemological assumptions. Further, another 
task for the rhetorical critic becomes clear: just as
familiarity with the philosophy and sociology of science 
enriches a rhetorical analysis, so too may a knowledge of 
various epistemological positions.
Considering the above, the goal of the rhetorical 
critic, then, is to examine this dissemination and 
mediation of knowledge claims and determine to what degree 
the scientific rhetor has established the reasonableness of 
his or her claims. Following are some specific conclusions 
I have reached considering the results of the rhetorical 
analysis of the cold fusion discourse.
For the most part, cold fusion discourse addressed the 
evidential issues, focusing on whether the cold fusion 
phenomenon did or did not exist. The scientists involved 
disseminated what they considered relevant evidence in 
order to address this issue of existence. Several lines of 
argument were invoked within this framework, not 
surprisingly those involved with the task of problem— 
solution and also those which address ethos, for revealing 
improprieties on the part of the experimenters is to raise 
questions concerning the scientific reliability of their 
evidence. Fleischmann and Pons chose to address their 
discourse to the evidential framework. This framework's
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foremost concern is considering whether evidence exists 
that supports claims; Fleischmann and Pons's evidence was 
insufficient to persuade as to the scientific 
reasonableness of the claim of cold fusion. As one 
reporter observed, "it is more sensible to reject sporadic 
and dubious readings than to reject well-established 
theories" ("The Secret Life" 90).
In several instances, the evidential issues raised by 
Fleischmann and Pons's critics were translated into 
methodological issues, the quest for accurate and reliable 
data becoming the task of proper application of 
experimental apparatus. For instance, Cal Lewis's 
criticisms concerning stirring of the waterbath in fusion 
cells to obtain accurate temperature measurements addressed 
the methodological/ definitional issue through the line of 
argument of e xpe r intent a 1 c ompet en c e . Jones attempted to 
reduce the possibility of criticism on this point through 
his lengthy description and graphic depiction of the design 
and implementation of his neutron detector.
Fleischmann and Pons had at their disposal other 
rhetorical options that might have made their claims more 
convincing to their audience. Had Fleischmann and Pons 
addressed the interpretative issue, instead of the 
evidential, they could have conjectured "that cold nuclear 
fusion may be an explanation of the excess heat 
phenomenon." Such a posturing would have allowed
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Fleischmann and Pons to present the same evidence while 
maintaining their claim to the cold fusion discovery.
Given the tentative nature of the evidence, this stance 
also might have seemed more scientifically reasonable by 
conjecturing that a particular scientific construct may 
explain the data and therefore evoked a less 
confrontational response from their audience. Having been 
presented with the evidence and asked a question such as, 
"Could cold nuclear fusion be an explanation?" the 
scientific audience could have joined with Fleischmann and 
Pons in determining an explanation. Fleischmann and Pons 
may also have been able to invoke the spirit of puzzle- 
solving that Kuhn suggests fills much of the scientist's 
experimental time.
Why Fleischmann and Pons chose to present their work 
in the evidential framework as opposed to the more 
promising interpretative is a question that cannot be 
answered certainly. However, I suggest here two possible 
explanations with some interesting implications for 
rhetorical choice. First, Fleischmann and Pons may have 
been influenced, as discussed above, by their perceptions 
of the scientist's role, scientist as producer of truth or 
scientist as arguer for interpretations of evidence. Their 
evidential stance is the more decisive and emphatic stance, 
implying the notion of scientist as producer of truth; the 
interpretative is the more tentative, offering possible
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explanations for the evidence and depicting the scientist 
as interpreter of evidence. An interesting question to 
investigate is how epistemological stance may have 
influenced Fleischmann and Pons's choice.
Secondly, Fleischmann and Pons may not have addressed 
the interpretative issue simply because that is not how 
electrochemists typically communicate with other 
electrochemists. Electrochemistry is a more applied, less 
theoretical field than, for instance, nuclear physics. 
Perhaps Fleischmann and Pons never considered the 
possibility of situating their discourse in the 
interpretative issue because electrochemists are 
unaccustomed to theoretical interpretations of their 
evidence. Nuclear physics, on the other hand, is a more 
theoretical, less applied field, and physicists might be 
more accustomed to writing theoretical, interpretative 
papers. Indeed, as shown in the rhetorical analysis, Jones 
does address the interpretative issue when introducing 
evidence for his cold fusion claim. Interestingly enough, 
Fleischmann and Pons might have made an appropriate 
rhetorical choice considering both their field of specialty 
and that field's audience. This thought suggests that 
while Fleischmann and Pons may have used a stance suitable 
for the audience of electrochemists, they experienced some 
difficulty in identifying and addressing relevant issues 
for nuclear physicists.
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The rhetorical analysis suggests also that scientists 
communicating beyond their specialty may fail to identify 
and therefore address differing concepts of what 
constitutes valid evidence. This finding validates Kuhn's 
concept of the disciplinary matrix. Fleischmann and Pons, 
as electrochemists, fashioned an experiment and employed 
apparatus intended to detect heat. Two of their four 
experiments were set up for calorimetric measurements, the 
evidence upon which they based their cold fusion claims. 
Jones, a physicist, constructed his own sensitive neutron 
detector (the only one of its kind) and proceeded to look 
for neutron production as fusion evidence. Because 
physicists considered neutron production as reliable 
evidence of cold fusion, Fleischmann and Pons's claims were 
less convincing to that audience, especially considering 
that the neutron rate they detected was less than normally 
expected for such a phenomenon. And although the 
physicists insisted that the low neutron rates disproved 
cold fusion, the chemists insisted that the excess heat 
production could be due only to a nuclear— not chemical—  
reaction.
Fortunately, no permanent rift between chemists and 
physicists appeared. In a July 1989 editorial entitled, 
"End of cold fusion in sight," Maddox happily reported that 
"the brief spell in April when it seemed as if cold fusion
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would permanently divide chemists and physicists has left 
no trace" ("End" 15).
Additionally apparent is that the scientists' basic 
assumptions, inherent before the experiments were 
conducted, determined the configurations of the experiments 
and what evidence the scientists would look for.
Considering such, one may imagine the possibility that 
researchers exhibiting such behavior could altogether 
overlook other significant phenomenon.
Further hampering Fleischmann and Pons's rhetorical 
success was their violation of several scientific values 
and standards, damaging their ethos. Not the least of 
these ethical lapses were bypassing the peer-review process 
in favor of the infamous press conference and their secrecy 
concerning their process and apparatus. This concern with 
ethos was not evident in the research articles themselves, 
such lines of argument seeming inappropriate for such a 
forum. However, these concerns are apparent in the Maddox 
editorial, indicating that the scientific community was 
aware of these violations and their possible effect on the 
scientific ethos in general. That the community of 
research scientists involved in fusion research was 
influenced by such editorials is easily argued, the best 
support being the appearance of the Maddox editorial 
decrying the claims of cold fusion in the same issue of 
Nature in which Jones's initial publication appeared. Such
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communications played an important role in the discourse of 
this "hard science" controversy, perhaps not to the degree 
of research articles, but as one avenue whereby such 
concerns are voiced and disseminated.
The unusual circumstances involved in the cold fusion 
controversy offered a unique opportunity to examine 
rhetoric's role in scientific discourse. Whether cold 
fusion exists as a phenomenon is still a mystery. However, 
I maintain that Fleischmann and Pons had at their disposal 
alternative rhetorical choices that could have increased 
the effectiveness of their discourse. Had they followed 
scientific standards and approached their rhetorical 
situation differently, even though the claims of cold 
fusion were not confirmed in the laboratory, the line of 
research might have seemed more credible and the scientific 
community more energized by its possibilities.
In answering Overington's call to students of rhetoric 
to turn their skills to the analysis of scientific 
discourse, I have attempted to reveal essential aspects of 
the cold fusion controversy— and scientific practice—  
otherwise hidden to the lay observer and quite possibly to 
the involved scientists themselves. Informed by a 
background in the sociology and philosophy of science and a 
working theory of rhetorical analysis, I hope to have 
demonstrated that even someone situated far outside the
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field of the hard sciences such as electrochemistry and 
atomic, nuclear, and particle physics can access highly 
specialized scientific discourse and make it intelligible.
Many possibilities and much work remain for rhetorical 
critics. Perhaps the most exciting possibilities lie in 
asking the question, "What are the specific issues and 
lines of argument specific to various disciplines?" Once 
these are identified, a matrix such as Prelli's could be 
constructed and used in rhetorical analysis for each. For 
instance, what are the issues and arguments used by 
psychologists? Would these differ from those used by 
composition theorists? A formalized method for both 
invention and analysis would open the possibilities for the 
rhetorical study of many fields.
When studying specific fields, many questions remain 
to be answered. For instance, how do constructs such as 
disciplinary matrices affect communication within 
disciplines? Across disciplines? Do the epistemological 
assumptions of that disciplined participants influence 
rhetorical choice? Also, rhetorical critics should begin 
to identify what discursive media exist for those 
participants other than the written medium. For instance, 
in the cold fusion controversy, meetings and conferences 
played an important role in scientists' conclusions about 
cold fusion. To what extent is that role rhetorical? How
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do the conclusions reached at such meetings influence 
written discourse?
Finally, knowledge of the philosophy and sociology of 
science greatly enhanced the rhetorical analysis of the 
cold fusion controversy. This circumstance would imply 
that the rhetorical critic should bring to bear in an 
analysis knowledge beyond that of only rhetoric. In 
studying various disciplines, then, what types and what 
scope of additional knowledge must the rhetorical critic 
seek out to enrich an analysis?
These questions suggest that the task of rhetorical 
analysis is a complicated one. However, the importance of 
making scientific and other specialized discourses 
accessible to those outside the specialties is a task of 
increasing importance. As Overington suggests, "To 
understand public discourse in the closing decades of this 
century, we must have some understanding of scientific 
discourse" (81). Scientists everyday make decisions that 
impact more and more on public life and policy. The 
rhetorical critic is in a unique position to sort through 
the complexities of strategy and choice, identify issues 
and arguments, and make the process and products of 
scientific discourse more accessible.
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